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REMEDIES IN DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF




There are surprisingly few reported cases involving issues concern-
ing the remedies available for breach of an agreement to buy and sell
a business. No articles directly on the subject have been found, nor
have any of the leading treatises on contracts or damages included
even a single section specifically devoted to the area. At most, there
is an occasional passing reference to a remedial problem arising out of
the sale of a business, or the use of an example which happens to
involve such a set of facts. In large measure, however, the principles
governing the availability and scope of remedies in this situation are
those generally applicable throughout the law.
While the law in this area has been developed almost entirely by
the courts rather than the legislatures, no problem of remedies in
connection with business purchase contracts should be deemed satis-
factorily analyzed unless consideration is also given to the possible
relevance of the Uniform Commercial Code. Hence, initial attention
will be given to questions, still largely unresolved, concerning the extent
to which the Code may affect the result. And since some of the legal
rules otherwise applicable may nevertheless be subject to a contrary
expression by the parties in their contract, a brief discussion of the
extent to which this is so will precede a more detailed analysis of the
various remedies normally available to the victim of a breach. Finally,
the rights of a victim of misrepresentation will be examined, both at
common law and, where applicable, pursuant to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.
Whenever possible, sale-of-business situations have been used as
examples or illustrations of pertinent' general principles; cases involv-
ing business sales have been cited in preference to those involving
other factual situations.
* This article is based upon a chapter, written by the author, for a book to be
published in the Summer of 1971 by the Practising Law Institute, entitled Buying and
Selling a Business, under the editorship of John W. Herz, Esq.
The author gratefully acknowledges helpful suggestions and criticism from Mr.
Hera and from Professors William L. Cary and William F. Young, Jr., of the Columbia
Law School, as well as the thorough and capable research assistance of Raymond A.
Levites, Esq., of the Class of 1970, Columbia Law School.
** A.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1938; LL.B., Harvard, 1941. Professor of Law,
Columbia University.
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II. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AS A SOURCE OF LAW
While the direct applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code
to remedial problems arising out of the sale of a business is quite
limited, the Code—especially Article 2—must nevertheless be regarded
as a principal source of law in this area. If applied literally, Article 2
would appear to have little relevance to cases of this kind. It expressly
applies only to "transactions in goods,"r and "goods" are defined as
"all things . . . which are movable other than . . . investment securities
(Article 8) and things in action . . . ." 2 If, therefore, the sale is of
stock, as distinguished from assets, it would be excluded from this
definition.' Although Article 8 of the Code is entitled "Investment
Securities," it does not pitrport to set forth the law of sales of stocks
and bonds as Article 2 does with respect to the sale of goods;' instead,
it is more of a special negotiable instruments law parallel to Article 3
of the Code (Commercial Paper), 8 both subjects having been previ-
ously covered in large part by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law.
A sale of the assets of a business will normally include at least
some "goods," for example, inventory, office supplies, raw materials,
and, in some cases, machinery and equipment.° Sometimes, a major
fraction of the assets sold may qualify as goods; in other cases, the
portion may be trivial as contrasted with the real property, leaseholds,
U.C.C. § 2-102. [All citations to the Uniform Commercial Code is this article will
be to the 1962 Official Text unless otherwise indicated.]
2 U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
3 Stock certificates were traditionally regarded as "things in action," and thus were
held excluded from the definition of "goods" in § 76(1) of the Uniform Sales Act, which
included "all chattels personal other than things in action and money." See 3 S. Williston
on Sales § 619a (rev. ed. 1948). The express exclusion of investment securities, in addition
to "things in action," in U.C.C. § 2-105(1), would thus seem to be redundant. While
it might be contended that, in order to give effect to every phrase, § 2-105(1) would have
to be construed to include within "goods" such stocks or bonds as did not qualify as
investment securities under Article 8 (see note 4 infra), the draftsmen of the Code seem
to have had no such intention.
4 U.C.C. § 8-102(1) defines "security," for the purpose of applicability of Article
8, broadly enough to include both stocks and bonds, but limits it to "a type commonly
dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized in any area in
which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment." U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(a)(ii).
Thus, stock in a closely held corporation might not fall within Article 8. In any event,
nowhere in Article 8 are there rules as to the measure of damages or other remedies for
breaches of contract to buy or sell securities.
5 See Comment to U.C.C.	 8-101: "The Article . .. may be likened . . to a
negotiable instruments law dealing with securities."
0 If not fixtures, machinery and equipment are clearly "goods." Fixtures, however,
if included in a sale of assets, may or may not be deemed to be "goods" under Article 2
of the Code; if they are to be severed from the realty they are included among goods,
but if the sale includes the realty as well as the fixtures attached thereto, they are not.
U.C.C. § 2-107(1).
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contract rights, accounts receivable, goodwill and so forth, which are
being sold. Thus, several questions arise: Does Article 2 of the Code
apply to the whole transaction: (a) if any part of the subject matter
is goods; (b) if the principal part is goods; or (c) only if it is all
goods? Or must we have two separate bodies of law applicable to a
single transaction—the Code for the goods involved and the common
law for the remainder? Or should there be different answers, depending
upon which provisions of the Code are invoked? Unfortunately, there
are no answers to these important questions either in the Code or in
the official comments of the draftmen, which are, for most purposes,
the nearest thing we have to a legislative history of the Code.
Thus far, there seems to be only one reported case dealing directly
with this problem. In Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 7
 a fragmented
result was reached, with - Article 2 applied to the goods that were to
have changed hands but not to the rest of the transaction. A contract
for the sale of a radio station as a going concern (including goodwill,
the station's license, real estate, studios, transmission equipment, and
office equipment and furnishings) was breached by the buyer. The
parties stipulated the measure of damages to be the difference between
the contract price and the resale price. Section 2-706(3) of the Code
precludes use of that measure of damages in the case of a private
resale of goods unless the defaulting buyer is given reasonable notifica-
tion, which was not done in this case. No more than ten percent in
value of the assets sold were goods. The court held the resale price
inapplicable as to the goods but determinative as to the rest of the
assets. It therefore reduced the measure of damages by ten percent.°
While such a divided result was manageable in this particular
case, it is obvious that there are many instances in which anything
other than a single rule for an entire contract would be intolerable.°
7 381 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1967).
8 Ordinarily if the resale failed to meet the standard of U.C.C. § 2-706(3), the stan-
dard test of contract price minus market price would have been applied. U.C.C. § 2-708(1).
But the court stated: "ESlince the parties stipulated that contract price less resale price
was to be the measure of damages, if any, the breach of promise to purchase the goods
is unremediable." 381 F.2d at 226. It might have been more appropriate to substitute
the test of the market price and allow the resale price to serve as evidence thereof. The
court might also have held the stipulation to be a valid variation, by agreement, of the
principles of the Code. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3),
9 The plaintiff in Foster contended that the sale of the goods was incidental to the
main purpose of the transaction—the transfer of the radio station as a going concern—
and that the Code should, therefore, not be applied at all, citing Epstein v. Giannattasio,
25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963), in support of its position. 381 F.2d 222 at 226.
In Epstein, plaintiff, a customer of a beauty parlor, was harmed by a product applied in
the course of her treatment. She contended that the transaction included the sale of a good
and hence brought into play the warranty provisions of the Code. The court held that
there was no sale of the product, since the predominant feature of the transaction was
827
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There are even some situations in which there would be a valid
enforceable contract to the extent that Article 2 applied, but no
binding agreement whatsoever as to the rest. In some other cases, the
entire agreement might be effective, but the rights and duties of the
parties might be different with respect to some of the assets to be sold
as compared with others. And the applicable remedial provisions might
vary as to goods and non-goods in circumstances much more difficult
to unscramble than in the Foster case.
Examples of a few of the many situations in which such a split
result would seem clearly to be unworkable include the following:
(a) A signed promise to keep an offer open despite lack
of consideration is binding under section 2-205, but generally
is revocable elsewhere in the law.
(b) An expression of acceptance stating terms addi-
tional to or different from those offered is effective as an
acceptance in certain circumstances, pursuant to section
2-207, but serves merely as a rejection and counter-offer in
other areas of the law.
(c) An agreement modifying a contract under Article
2 needs no consideration to be binding (section 2-209(1));
outside of Article 2 it would be ineffective in most states.
(d) The authorization to courts to refuse to enforce
unconscionable contracts (section 2-302) is probably more
sweeping under Article 2 than the powers granted to or
asserted by courts in other situations.
the sale of services. The Tenth Circuit regarded this case as distinguishable, since in the
Foster case some goods were clearly being sold. 381 F.2d at 222, 226.
The Epstein decision is consistent with a number of cases, both before and under the
Code, in which a transaction involving part sale and part service, such as a blood trans-
fusion or the provision of food in a restaurant, is treated by the courts as all sale or all
service. See, e.g., Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954);
Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc. 185 So.2d 749 (D.C. App. Fla. 1966); Temple
v. Keeler, 238 N.Y. 344, 144 N.E. 635 (1924); Cheshire v. Southhampton Hosp. Men, 53
Misc.2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967). Other courts may well follow this
approach in cases of the sale of businesses, allowing the predominant feature of the trans-
action to control in order to permit application of a single rule of law to the whole trans-
action. See, e.g., Parker v. Johnston, 244 Ark. 355, 426 S.W.2d 155 (1968), which in-
volved the sale of a vending machine business. While the opinion is not explicit in this
respect, it is probable that the transaction included not only the sale of machines but
also the assignment of ongoing contracts and perhaps goodwill. The court applied U.C.C.
{ 2-608, providing for revocation of acceptance where the sale had been induced by mis-
statements as to the earnings of the business.
Nevertheless, the Foster case, while sharply criticized (See, R. Duesenberg & L. King,
Sales and Bulk Transfers under the Uniform Commercial Code 3-4 (Supp. 1970)), may
be influential in other courts. While ordinarily the decision of a federal court, engaging in
conjecture as to the Law of the state in which it sits, might not be of great weight as
precedent, the command to construe and apply the Uniform Commercial Code "to make
uniform the law among the various jurisdictions" (U.C.C. $ 1-102(c)) may induce other
courts to follow the first decision on an issue.
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(e) The parties can make a binding contract to sell
goods even though the price is not settled, under section
2-305; in cases outside Article 2, an open price term generally
renders the agreement unenforceable as "an agreement to
agree."
(f) The preclusion of a buyer from asserting a breach,
if he fails to specify it when the seller, after rejection, had
demanded a full and final written statement of defects (sec-
tion 2-605(1) (b)), has no counterpart outside of Article 2
of the Code. This applies not only to the use of the defect as
a basis for a claim but also to its employment as a reason for
the buyer to reject a tender and refuse to pay.
What may be a more attractive solution to problems of this kind
is for the courts to treat the Code as a source of law by analogy and
apply its principles to cases to which it is not literally applicable.
Section 1-102(1) states: "This Act shall be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies." Liberal con-
struction, of course, is not the same thing as application to a situation
clearly not covered. The official comment to this section, however,
goes somewhat further and appears to invite the use of the statute by
way of analogy. 10 While such a technique has been employed more
liberally in civil law jurisdictions, there has been a growing body of
cases in which American courts have employed this approach,“ as well
as scholarly exhortations to courts to treat statutes as sources of general
policy and apply that policy wherever it would be pertinent, even
though the statute would not literally apply. 12
10 U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 1, includes the following:
Courts . . . have recognized the policies embodied in an act as applicable in rea-
son to subject-matter which was not expressly included in the language of the
act, Commercial Nat. Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co.,
239 U.S. 520, 36 S. Ct. 194, 60 L. Ed, 417 (1916) (bona Me purchase policy of
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act extended to case not covered but of equivalent
nature). They have done the same, where reason and policy so required, even
where the subject-matter had been intentionally excluded from the act in general.
Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934) (Uniform Sales Act change in
seller's remedies applied to contract for sale of choses in action even though the
general coverage of that Act was intentionally limited to goods "other than things
in action.") . . . Nothing in this Act stands in the way of continuance of such
action by the courts.
11 For a very recent example, see the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). See also Agar v. Orda, 264
N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934), referred to repeatedly in the official comments to the Code,
and obviously intended by the draftsmen as a model of judicial technique. Contra, Porter
v. Gibson, 25 Cal.2d 506, 154 P.2d 703 (1944).
12 See Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Ham. L. Rev. 4, 13 (1936):
"I can find in the history and principles of the common law no adequate reason for our
failure to treat a statute much more as we treat a judicial precedent, as both a declaration
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This invitation to use the Code as a source of policy even where
it is not literally applicable would seem to offer the courts a most
convenient technique for dealing with both situations mentioned above:
(a) the sale of stock; and (b) the sale of assets only a portion of which
are "goods." With respect to the sale of stock, there is a further
invitation to employ the Code by analogy in Comment 1 to Section
2-105 (defining "goods"):
"Investment securities" are expressly excluded from the
coverage of this Article. It is not intended by this exclusion,
however, to prevent the application of a particular section of
this Article by analogy to securities (as was done with the
Original Sales Act in Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E.
479, 99 A.L.R. 269 (1934) when the reason of that section
makes such application sensible and the situation involved is
not covered by the Article of this Act dealing specifically
with such securities (Article 8).' 3
Where assets of a mixed nature are sold, the same principle would
suggest that Article 2 of the Code may be applied directly with respect
to the goods and by analogy with respect to the rest of the assets, so
that a single, consistent legal structure can be brought into play."
It therefore seems clear that the provisions of Article 2 of the
Code are likely to be either dispositive or at least persuasive sources
and a source of law, and as a premise for legal reasoning." See also Landis, Statutes and
the Sources of the Law, in Harvard Legal Essays 213 (1934); Farnsworth, Implied War-
ranties of Quality in Non-Sale Cases, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 653 (1957).
13 Article 2 has occasionally been applied in this manner by the courts. U.C.C.
§ 2-204(3), which states: "Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for
sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and
there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy," has been applied
to a contract for the sale of corporate stock, in Pennsylvania Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co.,
39 Del. Ch. 453, 462-63, 166 A.2d 726, 731-32 (Del. Ch. 1960), appeal dismissed, 40 Del.
Ch. 1, 172 A.2d 63 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1961). In a number of other cases, attempts to apply
Article 2 of the Code to sales of securities have failed because the cited provisions were
deemed inapposite rather than because of the refusal of the courts to apply Article 2. See
Saphier v. Devonshire Street Fund, Inc., 352 Mass. 683, 691-92, 227 N.E.2d 714, 720
(1967); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 41 Del. Ch. 548, 570-71, 200 A.2d 441, 454
(1964); In re Schoettle Co., 390 Pa. 365, 374, 134 A.2d 908, 913 (1957).
Article 2 has also been applied by analogy in other areas of the law. This has occurred
especially frequently in connection with leases of personal property. See, e.g., Sawyer
v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968).
14 It may well be that a single approach applying equally to all parts of Article 2
would not be appropriate. While those provisions dealing with formation of a contract
(U.C.C. 11 2-204-207), for example, seemingly must be applied entirely or not at all, it
is less clear that provisions for the allocation of risk of loss (U.C.C. §1 2-509, 2-510)
have much relevance to immovable or intangible property, or that the Article 2 statutes
of frauds (U.C.C. §2-201) or limitations (U.C.C. 12-725) should be applied to areas in
which the legislature has enacted a different provision.
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of authority in answering questions involving remedies for breach of
a contract to buy and sell a business.
III. EFFECT OF THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS
Many of the principles of law pertaining to remedies for breach
of contract are suppletive—that is, they apply only in the absence
of an expression of intention by the parties and may be changed by
the parties if they see fit." This is as true with respect to contracts
providing for the sale of a business as to any other kind of contract.
The principle is not, however, entirely without exception.
A contract will normally prescribe the respective performances of
the parties. It follows that what is or is not a breach is also determined,
at least in part, by the terms of the contract. When it comes to the
consequences of a breach, however, the rules are a bit more com-
plicated.
As will be seen below," in the absence of an expression by the
parties, the courts will have to determine when a breach is sufficiently
material to justify the innocent party in withholding his performance,
and when it is sufficiently total to give him the election of terminating
the contract and demanding restitution instead of suing for damages.
Since the parties may, if they wish, expressly state which performances
by one are conditions concurrent with or precedent to which perfor-
mances by the other, these matters are generally within the range of
what may be controlled by the parties themselves in their agreement."
We must distinguish, however, between what may be called pri-
mary obligations, that is, those which the contract calls upon the
parties to perform, and remedial obligations, that is, those imposed
upon the parties by law if they fail to obey certain of their primary
obligations. With respect to the latter, the courts have been much less
15 This principle is reasserted in U.C.C. § 1-102(3):
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as other-
wise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement
but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the perfor-
mance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable.
18 See pp. 836-38, 852-53 infra.
17 Quite frequently the contract will explicitly state that the truth of every war-
ranty and the performance of every covenant of one party is a condition to the other
party's duty to perform. Such a provision will be upheld in instances of material breach
of warranty or covenant, but there is some doubt whether courts will apply it literally
where a breach is trivial. See Restatement of Contracts § 302 (1932): "A condition may
be excused without other reason if its requirement (a) will involve extreme forefeiture
or penalty, and (b) its existence or occurrence forms no essential part of the exchange
for the promisor's performance."
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permissive. A frequently encountered example of the unwillingness
of courts to give the parties carte blanche power to prescribe remedies
is their refusal to enforce what they deem to be penalty clauses, even
if the contract expressly refers to them as "liquidated damages.' 8
This is not to suggest, however, that the contract may never vary
the rules as to remedies that would otherwise be applied by the courts.
Valid liquidated damages clauses, of course, preclude application of the
measure of damages that would otherwise be applied. An agreement
may, in fact, deny either or both parties any right to damages in the
event of certain types of breach, or all breaches, and limit a plaintiff
to a right to rescind and receive restitution of the consideration he had
given. On the other hand, rescission may be barred and damages made
the sole remedy.'9 Nor are the parties precluded from inventing novel
forms of remedy" or methods of computation so long as they are
reasonable and are not regarded as unconscionable." In addition,
"indemnification" clauses, frequently found in business sale contracts,
may set forth some obligations not expressly contained in the listings
of covenants and warranties; they may also prescribe the remedies
available in various circumstances, as well as the parties in favor of
and against whom such remedies are to run.
There is a limiting principle, however, that the contract may not
leave a party without a reasonably effective remedy. This principle is
embodied in Section 2-719 of the Code, which, while permitting
"remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this
Article,' also states: "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as
18 See pp. 845-49 infra.
19 A contract providing specifically for one remedy is not generally construed to
preclude the aggrieved party from opting for another remedy unless the fact that the
named remedy is intended to be exclusive is made quite clear. In Nelson v. Spence, 182
Cal. App.2d 493, 6 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1960), a contract for the sale of a peat moss business
included warranties as to an exclusive source of supply and also provided for rescission
for breach. The warranty was broken, and the court allowed the buyer to elect to sue
for damages instead of rescission. This principle is carried even further in U.C.C.
§ 2-719(1)(b), which states that resort to the remedy provided is optional unless it is
expressly agreed to be exclusive.
20 A provision for forefeiture of a pound of flesh would not be recommended. Any-
way, it might not be deemed "novel," as it has already been tried.
21 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-719, 2-302. Limitations which would otherwise be enforced
will be stricken if fraudulently procured. In Lockwood v. Christakos, 181 F.2d 805 (D.C.
Cir. 1950), there were fraudulent oral misrepresentations as to the volume of business of
a sandwich shop being sold. A clause in the contract disclaimed the making of or reliance
on any representations. While observing that innocent misrepresentations would be suffi-
cient to justify rescission in such a case, the court held that the disclaimer of representa-
tions would have been given effect in the absence of fraud but in the circumstances would
be stricken and the plaintiff allowed to rescind.
22 U.C.C. 4 2-719(1)(a).
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provided in this Act."' It is also likely, although there is little case
law on the subject, that a recitation in a contract that remedies at law
would be inadequate, and that the parties agree that in the event of
breach specific performance shall be imposed, would not be deemed
binding upon the court."
IV. TYPES OF BREACH OF CONTRACT
It would be futile to try to catalogue all of the ways in which a
party may breach a contract for the purchase or sale of a business.
Any promise or warranty of either party may be broken. 25 Some of
the types most frequently encountered are set forth by way of illustra-
tion, but not with a view to suggesting that such a listing is exhaustive.
Either party may, of course, refuse to close, or a buyer may
refuse to pay, or a seller to convey stock or assets. Assuming that it
is not justified by the other party's breach, such a refusal may be a
complete repudiation of the entire contract and fully actionable; it
may, on the other hand, be merely a matter of delay, with the breach-
ing party intending, and communicating the intention, to close a short
23 U.C.C. § 2-719(2). See also U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 1, which states:
Under this section parties are left free to shape their remedies to their partic-
ular requirements and reasonable agreements limiting or modifying remedies are
to be given effect.
However, it is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum
adequate remedies be available. If the parties intend to conclude a contract for
sale within this Article they must accept the legal consequence that there be at
least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined
in the contract. Thus any clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial
provisions of this Article in an unconscionable manner is subject to deletion
and in that event the remedies made available by this Article are applicable
as if the stricken clause had never existed. Similarly, under subsection (2),
where an apparently fair and reasonable clause because of circumstances fails
in its purpose or operates to deprive either party of the substantial value of the
bargain, it must give way to the general remedy provisions of this Article.
24 see, e .g
., Stokes v. Moore, 262 Ala. 59, 77 So.2d 331 (1955), which involved an
employment contract containing a covenant not to compete for a year following ter-
mination, together with clauses for liquidated damages and also a provision for a
restraining order or injunction in case of violation. While holding that the injunction was
expressive of the intention of the parties that the liquidated damages provision was not
to be the exclusive remedy, and ordering the issuance of a temporary injunction, the
court stated:
We do not wish to express the view that an agreement for the issuance of
an injunction, if and when a stipulated state of facts arises in the future, is
binding on the court to that extent. Such an agreement would serve to oust
the inherent jurisdiction of the court to determine whether an injunction is ap-
propriate when applied for and to require its issuance even though to do so
would be contrary to the opinion of the court.
Id. at 64, 77 So.2d at 335.
25 "A breach of contract is a non-performance of any contractual duty of im-
mediate performance. A breach may be total or partial, and may take place by failure
to perform acts promised, by prevention or hindrance, or by repudiation." Restatement
of Contracts 312 (1932).
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time later. Depending upon the entire agreement, and perhaps the
surrounding circumstances as well (and especially if time is expressly
or implicitly of the essence), such a delay might nevertheless be a
total breach, excusing the innocent party from further performance,
and giving rise to an immediate cause of action for any of a number
of remedies; it may, on the other hand, be a mere minor breach,
permitting an action for the comparatively small damages flowing from
the delay, but not terminating the contract as a whole; or it may, if
waived or in certain other circumstances, not be actionable at all. 20
Refusals to perform lesser obligations due at the closing also may or
may not be deemed material, depending on their nature and the terms
of the contract.
Either party may be guilty of a breach of warranty in connection
with a business sale. Warranties usually flow from the seller. Where a
sale of stock is involved, there may be warranties of title, warranties
as to balance sheets, profit and loss statements, and other aspects of
the business being sold. Where assets are sold, any or all of these
warranties may also be present.
There are fewer things a buyer is likely to warrant (as distin-
guished from promise), but if the business is sold for shares of stock
in the buyer's company, warranties concerning that stock or the buying
corporation itself are usually included and, in turn, may, therefore,
be breached." Quite frequently, the agreement contains promises to
be performed after the closing. The purchase price, for example, may
be payable in installments, with the latter either fixed in time and
amount or variable depending on the level of post-closing earnings.
The agreement may also call for payment of certain or all creditors
by the seller; conversely, however, in some contracts the buyer prom-
ises the seller that he will assume such obligations. A breach of such
a clause by either party may, therefore, give rise to a cause of action
by the other party, as well as a possible claim by the creditor as a
third party beneficiary.
As part of the sale of a business there is often a collateral contract
providing for the employment of certain principal officials of the selling
company by the buyer. A breach by either employer or employee may
be actionable; if the seller itself promises that certain of its personnel
26 Restatement of Contracts { 275 (1932) sets forth general rules for determining
when a breach is material, and 276 contains specific guidelines where the breach takes
the form of delay. If a breach is "material," it excuses the counter-performance of the
other party ; in addition, it permits him to treat the contract as totally breached and
to sue for whatever remedies for breach of the entire contract are appropriate. Restate-
ment of Contracts 313, 317, 327 (1932).
27 Forms frequently employed for business sale agreements convert pre-closing
promises and conditions into warranties at the closing, which survive the closing and
may be breached at a later time.
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will enter into employment arrangements with the buyer, the seller
may be guilty of a breach of contract if they refuse.
A type of breach peculiar to the seller's side would be that of a
covenant not to compete. Individual sellers so covenanting may
commit a breach and, if a seller covenants that certain of its employ-
ees will not compete, their violation may make the seller guilty of a
breach.
At this point, a distinction should be noted between promises and
conditions. Performance of a promise by one party may be a condition
to part or all of the performance of the other, and failure by the one
may suspend or excuse the obligation of the other. There are instances,
however, where either because of provisions of the contract or, in their
absence, a decision that the law treats the performances as independent,
a party may be obliged to continue his performance despite the other's
breach.28
Conversely, certain events may be conditions to a party's duty to
perform, while their breach gives rise to no cause of action. For
example, a contract may provide that a buyer is free to cancel if the
seller's profits for a given period—for example, the period between
the contract date and the closing date—fail to attain a designated level;
this is to be distinguished from a case in which the seller warrants that
level of profits. Also distinguished from that case would be a provision
making the payment of post-closing installments of the purchase
price dependent upon the level of earnings attained.
Similarly, the failure of the seller to induce a principal employee
to enter into an employment contract with the buyer may, if the
contract so provides, excuse the buyer from proceeding with the
purchase, even if the seller does not promise that the employee will
do so and, thus, has committed no breach. The first place to look to
determine what events are promised, which are conditions, and which
are both, is the contract itself; in the absence of a clear expression by
the parties, the courts will fill the interstices as best they can. 2°
For almost every one of the aforementioned types of actual
breach, there may potentially be a corresponding repudiation, also
often referred to as an "anticipatory breach," in which the intention
28
 Rules applied by the courts, in a wide range of situations in which the question
arises of whether performances are conditional or independent and the issue is not ex-
pressly resolved by the contract, are set forth in Restatement of Contracts §§ 266-90
(1932).
29 Some principles of interpretation, helpful in this respect, are set forth in Restate-
ment of Contracts $§ 260-63 (1932).
With respect to the sale of goods, the Uniform Commercial Code provides that in
the absence of agreement to the contrary, tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's
duty to accept and pay for the goods, and tender of payment is a condition to the seller's
duty to tender and complete any delivery. U.C.C. §§ 2-507(1), 2-511(1).
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in manifested not to render a performance due at a future time, or the
inability so to perform is communicated to the other party. Such an
anticipatory breach is itself actionable in roughly the same fashion as
a completed breach," except for the possibility of retraction of the
repudiation before a change of position by the other party.'
V. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
The principal remedies for breach of contract (including breaches
of warranty)" are damages, restitution and specific performance.
80 Restatement of Contracts § 318 (1932). With respect to the sale of goods, U.C.C.
§ 2-610 sets forth the following rule:
When either party repudiates the contract with respect to a performance not
yet due the loss of which will substantially impair the value of the contract to
the other, the aggrieved party may
(a) for a commercially reasonable time await performance by the
repudiating party; or
(b) resort to any remedy for breach (Section 2-703 or Section 2-
711), even though he has notified the repudiating party that he
would await the latter's performance and urged retraction; and
(c) in either case suspend his own performance or proceed in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Article on the seller's right
to identify goods to the contract notwithstanding breach or to
salvage unfinished goods (Section 2-704).
81 Restatement of Contracts § 319 (1932); U.C.C. § 2-611.
82 A breach of one or more of the warranties in a business sale contract should be
regarded generally as giving rise to the same range of consequences as a breach of one
of the explicitly promissory clauses of the contract. In many instances, the breach will
not go to the heart of the contract and, therefore, will not constitute a "material" or
"total" breach; but this may also be true in many instances of breach of a promise.
One difference in the treatment of warranties may be in the imposition of a higher
standard of promptness in asserting a breach of warranty. While delay for the full
period of the statute of limitations would not bar a damage claim for breach of a
promise (although its credibility might be seriously weakened thereby), there is author-
ity that a lapse of years from the time a buyer of all the stock of a corporation had
reason to know of a breach of financial warranties until he asserted the claim was suf-
ficient to bar his claim for damages. Franck v. J. J. Sugarman-Rudolph Co., 40 Ca1.2d
81, 251 P.2d 949 (1952).
Since restitution must always be demanded promptly (see pp. 853-54 infra), cases as-
serting the same principle as a bar to restitution by the buyer may be less significant
than damages cases in demonstrating that a prompt demand is required if breach of
warranty is to be claimed. See Royal Hair Pin Corp. v. Rieser Co., 18 App. Div.2d
925, 238 N.Y.S.2d 310 (2d Dep't 1963), appeal dismissed, 13 N.Y.2d 1044, 195 N.E.2d
317, 245 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1963); Sy-Jo Luncheonette, Inc. v. Marsav Distribs., Inc., 279
App. Div. 715, 108 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 747, 108 N.E.2d 614
(1952).
There is also authority that for a breach of warranty to be actionable, the ag-
grieved party must have relied on it. In Sy-Jo supra, the court held that a failure to
show reliance, as well as the lapse of time, barred buyer's claim for rescission.
Some, but not all, of these rules are effective where Article 2 of the Code applies.
The requirement of promptness in claiming breach of warranty in purchased goods is
continued, with somewhat greater specificity. The buyer is obliged "within a reasonable
time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach [to] notify the seller of
breach or be barred from any remedy. . . ." U.C.C. * 2-607(3) (a).
It should be noted that where the goods have been accepted, the buyer need not
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Each will be discussed below at some length. There are, in addition, a
number of miscellaneous responses to breach available to the aggrieved
party, which should also be mentioned.
A. Non-Performance by the Aggrieved Party
In some circumstances, upon a breach by one party, the other
party has the privilege of suspending his own performance, either
permanently or until such time as the breach is cured. Failure to
render a performance which is a condition precedent to or concurrent
with the aggrieved party's counter-performance will generally at least
permit the latter to withhold his performance; if the breach may
properly be characterized as "material," he may also treat the contract
as terminated and pursue his other remedies. 33
 No all-inclusive state-
ment can set forth the circumstances that make a breach "material,"
but a helpful catalogue of factors bearing upon that conclusion may be
found in the Restatement of Contracts Sections, 275 et seq." It should
be noted in this connection that for a breach to excuse the innocent
party from further performance, it must be concluded that the per-
formance which was not rendered was a condition precedent to or
concurrent with the performance of the innocent party which is ex-
cused. As pointed out above," the parties may specify in their contract
what performances by each of them are to be deemed precedent to or
concurrent with what performances by the other, and thus may them-
selves write their own body of law as to which breaches may be deemed
material and which may not. In the sale of a business, however, there
is likely to be a fairly lengthy catalogue of obligations imposed, partic-
"include a clear statement of all the objections that will be relied on by the buyer," and
his notification "need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is
still troublesome and must be watched." U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4. Where the goods
are being rejected, on the other hand, the buyer loses his rights unless he states the
particular defect he is relying upon if either (a) the seller could have cured it if it had
been stated seasonably, or (b) between merchants, after rejection, the seller has made a
written demand for a full and final statement of all defects. U.C.C. 2-605(1).
Reliance upon express warranties may not be absolutely necessary under the Code.
Section 2-313(1) (a), (h) and (c) require only that the warranty be "part of the basis
of the bargain," a standard probably easier to meet.
Under the Code, as in other areas of law, the measure of damages for breach of
warranty is the difference "between the value of the goods accepted and the value they
would have had if they had been as warranted...." § 2-714(2).
03 See Restatement of Contracts §§ 266 et seq. (1932).
34 The test by which it is determined whether a breach is sufficiently "material" to
justify the other party, not only in suspending his performance, but also in refusing to
proceed further and to treat the contract as terminated, is quite similar to the standard
of "total breach" which is a prerequisite to the right to demand restitution. Cf. pp. 852-
53 infra; Restatement of Contracts f§ 275, 313 et seq., 347 (1932). A non-material breach
may be a "total" breach if it is accompanied by a repudiation by the party in default.
Restatement of Contracts §§ 317, 318 (1932).
3° See pp. 831-33 supra.
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ularly upon the seller, but sometimes upon the buyer as well, with the
result that it is unlikely that every permutation and combination of
circumstances can be provided for in the contract." Where no such
provision is made, the answers must be found in the generally appli-
cable principles of law, and in many circumstances, predictions cannot
be made with a high degree of confidence.
B. Assurance of Performance
Another remedy, also not directly enforced in a legal action, is the
right to demand assurance of performance where a party has reason-
able grounds for insecurity. This right had found some expression even
before adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. However, Section
2-609 of the Code codifies it with some specificity, and although it
applies literally only to the sale of goods, the principle asserted would
seem appropriate for adoption by way of analogy to a wide range of
contractual situations. In connection with the sale of a business, a
demand for assurance of performance might well be appropriate where,
for example: either party indicated doubt as to whether he was going
to complete the transaction; a buyer's financial situation appeared to
be deteriorating, thus giving rise to reasonable apprehension as to his
ability to pay; either party might have entered into discussions with
a third party for a purchase or sale inconsistent with the contract
already entered into; a key employee, who was to have entered into an
employment contract, might be bargaining for a long-term contract
with another employer; information might come to light suggesting
that promises as to the performance of the seller's business prior to
closing will not be met. The common denominator in these examples is
that even though neither party may have yet committed an actionable
wrong, each party is entitled not only to ultimate performance, but also
to a measure of security that such performance will in fact be rendered.
As stated in Section 2-609(1) of the Code: "A contract for sale imposes
an obligation on each party that the other's expectation of receiving due
performance will not be impaired.""
Be Contracts for the sale of a business frequently provide, however, that perfor-
mance of each warranty and covenant is a condition to the other party's duty to per-
form. See note 16 supra.
37 See also U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 1:
The section rests on the recognition of the fact that the essential purpose of
a contract between commercial men is actual performance and they do not
bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus the right to win a lawsuit
and that a continuing sense of reliance and security that the promised perfor-
mance will be forthcoming when due, is an important feature of the bargain.
If either the willingness or the ability of a party to perform declines materially
between the time of contract and the time for performance, the other party is
threatened with the loss of a substantial part of what he has bargained for. A
seller needs protection not merely against having to deliver on credit to a shaky
8.38
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Under the Code provision, where a party has reasonable grounds
to regard himself as insecure in any of these respects, he may demand
adequate assurances of due performance from the other party and
suspend his own performance until such assurances are received. What
types of assurance may reasonably be demanded will depend upon all
of the circumstances, especially the basis for the insecurity. For ex-
ample, indications that the buyer has serious financial problems might
in some instances be satisfactorily disposed of by a mere explanation.
If, on the basis of all the facts, there is greater reason for apprehension,
a new certified balance sheet might suffice. In extreme cases, it might
be proper to insist upon a performance bond, a deposit of cash in
escrow, or even an advance payment of cash otherwise not due until
later. If adequate assurances are not forthcoming within a reasonable
time, the apprehensive party may treat the contract as repudiated."
C. Declaratory Judgments
Another remedy, not discussed elsewhere herein, is the declaratory
judgment. It may occasionally happen in the course of performance of
a business purchase contract that a party's needs will be satisfied by a
judicial declaration on a disputed issue pertaining to his rights against
the other party. More typically, however, if a disagreement cannot be
resolved informally, the pressures of time are likely to be such that
one party or the other will want a more direct remedy—either equi-
table relief (specific performance or an injunction) or a legal remedy
such as damages or restitution."
D. Damages
1. The Basic Standard: To Give the Plaintiff the Benefit of His
Bargain
The most frequently applied remedy for breach of contract is an
award of damages. "Damages," in contract actions, does not have the
normal meaning it would have in other areas of the law, for example,
in a tort case—namely, that the aggrieved party be put back in his
previous position. Contract damages are intended, instead, to put the
buyer, but also against having to procure and manufacture the goods, perhaps
turning down other customers. Once he has been given reason to believe that
the buyer's performance has become uncertain, it is an undue hardship to force
him to continue his own performance. Similarly, a buyer who believes that the
seller's deliveries have become uncertain cannot safely wait for the due date of
performance when he has been buying to assure himself of materials for his
current manufacturing or to replenish his stock of merchandise.
38 	§ 2-609(4).
38 Although arbitration may be regarded as a remedial device which may be em- •
pIoyed as an alternative to adjudication, it will not be discussed herein.
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plaintiff in the position he would have been in financially if the contract
had been performed.
While simple enough to state, this principle is not easy to apply
in business purchase cases. In a sale involving goods which are bought
and sold on an available market, damages are readily computed. If the
contract price is $10 and the market value is $11 and the seller defaults,
the buyer is entitled to $1 in damages.4° Correspondingly, if the con-
tract price is $11 and the market value is $10, an aggrieved seller is
entitled to $1 in damages." There is, however, normally no such ready
market for businesses. It would generally be quite difficult for a buyer
who has contracted to purchase a business for $1,000,000 to prove that
its value was really $1,100,000." Such proof is not necessarily impossi-
ble, however, and the courts have become increasingly permissive in
allowing expert testimony as to valuations of this kind. Such formulae
as multiples of earnings and the like may be employed. Devices for
determining valuation for other purposes—for example, just compen-
sation in cases of condemnation—presumably may be used. At best,
however, the task is a difficult one.
The use of market value as the yardstick was formerly not only
permissible, but generally mandatory in cases involving the sale of
goods, except where there was no market or the market value test did
not provide adequate compensation." If, for example, after default by
the buyer, the seller resold the goods, the resale price was at most
merely rebuttable evidence of the market value of the goods. The
Uniform Commercial Code, however, has developed a pair of alterna-
tive remedies for buyers and sellers which will sometimes achieve a
more just result. An aggrieved seller may resell the goods to another
party, and, if the sale is made under commercially reasonable circum-
stances and otherwise meets the statutory requirements, the resale
price fixes the measure of damages." The aggrieved buyer has an
analogous remedy under the Code known as "cover," whereby the
buyer replaces the goods he should have received from the seller. If
40 U.C.C. 2-713.
41 U.C.C. § 2-708. In both cases, the measure of damages expressed assumes an
entirely executory contract; where there has been part or full performance by the plain-
tiff, the damage would be increased accordingly. For example, if the buyer in the example
given above had paid the $10 price, his damages would be $11. Also in both cases, ap-
proKiate incidental and consequential damages may be recovered in addition to the
standard measure. U.C.C. § 2-710,2-715.
42 The test is often stated as that of value to the plaintiff, rather than in the
abstract, provided the defendant was aware at the time of entering into the contract of
any special factors in the plaintiff's situation that made his performance especially
valuable to the plaintiff. See 11 S. Williston on Contracts § 1343 (3d ed. 1968) [herein-
after cited as Williston].
48 Uniform Sales Act, § 64(3), 67(3).
44 U.C.C. 4 2-706.
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he does this in a commercially reasonable fashion, the purchase price
establishes his measure of damages" rather than being merely evidence
of value. Finally, it should be noted that there is no obligation under
the Code for the aggrieved seller to resell or the aggrieved buyer to
cover. These are merely alternative devices for establishing damages,
which the parties are free to employ or forego. Since no two businesses
are alike, cover is unlikely to be of much use in business purchase cases.
The resale option offered by the Code, however, may often be attractive
to the seller, and even though the sale may be one of stock, or of
assets only a small part of which are goods, there may be reason to
expect that courts may be persuaded to apply the resale provisions of
the Code by way of analogy.46
Since a breach of warranty is a type of breach of contract, dam-
ages are predicated upon the same basis, namely, that the plaintiff be
put in the same position he would have been in if the warranty had been
adhered to.'T In business purchase cases, it may not always be easy to
determine the difference in value between the business with the war-
ranty true and the warranty false. Breaches of warranty may pertain
to one non-repeating item, such as a lack of good title to a single piece
of property. In such cases, the diminution of value of that property
by reason of the defect might be the measure of damages. In other
cases, however, a breach of warranty might reflect a long-term repeat-
ing phenomenon, which should be capitalized; for example, if net
profits for the last full year were overstated by $10,000, and the
45 U.C.C. I 2-712.
45 But cf. Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1967), discussed
at p. 827 supra. Even if the resale price is not accepted as conclusive upon the measure
of damages, it may still serve as persuasive and frequently decisive evidence of the
market value of the business and thus, indirectly, have the same effect. The seller of a
business recovered upon this basis from a defaulting buyer in Pacific Odorite Corp. v.
Gersh, 94 Cal. App.2d 174, 210 13 .2d 318 (1949). While the converse—a buyer procuring
the same business from someone else—must be quite rare, an analogy may be found in the
case of a buyer who has a contract in hand to resell the business which the seller wrong-
fully fails to sell to him. In Delvitto v. Schiavo, 164 Pa. Super. 338, 64 A.2d 496 (1949),
the buyer of a hotel was permitted to recover the difference between the contract price
and the price for which he could have resold it. The court stressed the fact that the
seller knew of the resale contract at the time of the breach as a reason for allowing the
resale price to determine the measure of damages. Under the foreseeability test as gener-
ally applied (see p. 842 infra), however, the critical time for knowledge or reason to
know is that of the making of the contract rather than that of the breach. Compare
Amsterdam v. Marmor, 125 Misc. 865, 212 N.Y.S. .300 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1925),
rejecting, as incompetent, evidence of a resale contract.
47 As to sales of goods, this rule is set forth in U.C.C. * 2-714(2). A measure of
damages analogous to this was applied in a case of breach of a covenant not to compete
incident to the sale of a business. The court computed damages on the basis of the dif-
ference between the value of the business with and without the seller's competition.
Amsterdam v. Marmore, 125 Misc. 865, 212 N.Y.S. 300 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1925).
841
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
purchase price was based in large part on a formula of five times the
earnings, a claim for damages of $50,000 might be upheld."
2. Consequential Damages: Foreseeability
A plaintiff will often lose more from a breach than the mere
benefit of his bargain. The buyer, for instance, may have planned to
use the business to be acquired as an assured source of supply of
materials needed for a business already owned, and may be obliged to
curtail operations of the latter if the seller defaults. Similarly, a buyer's
default may deprive a seller of an opportunity to use the money to take
advantage of an exceptional investment opportunity. In either situation,
such consequential damages are recoverable only if losses of that
character could reasonably have been foreseen by the defendant at
the time the contract was made. This foreseeability doctrine, which
arose in the renowned English case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 49 is still
applied by modern courts, 5° and has been reaffirmed in the Uniform
Commercial Code."
If the parties to the agreement can anticipate consequences of
breach which would not normally follow in the absence of special cir-
cumstances, but which would be likely to occur in their situation, these
consequences can be communicated at or before the signing of the
contract, or better still, recited in the contract itself. Human foresight
is limited, however, and since the only thing that can be expected
with confidence is the unexpected, situations are bound to arise in which
various types of consequential damages must be regarded as too remote
to meet the test of foreseeability.
48 Damages based upon breach of a warranty as to the seller's net income might
over-compensate the buyer if a tax refund or other tax saving resulted therefrom. Con-
versely, a breach of warranty caused by the government's assertion of a tax deficiency
not scheduled by the seller might reflect a higher level of profits, increasing the value of
the company to the buyer. In such case, an award of damages to the buyer in the
amount of the tax deficiency might give him an unjustified windfall. Courts are slow
to take account of such tax considerations in determining the measure of damages, and
express provision for such contingencies should be included in the contract.
49 9 Ex. 341 (1854).
50 See, e.g., 5 A. Corbin on Contracts U 1007 et seq. (1964) Chereinafter cited as
Corbin].
51 U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) allows the buyer consequential damages resulting from the
seller's breach including "any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and
needs of which the seller at the time of contracting bad reason to know and which could
not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." There is no comparable provision
as to seller's damages, presumably because of the comparative rarity of cases in which
the seller of goods suffers any indirect tosses from the temporary withholding from him
of the sales price. In that situation, consequential damages are usually restricted to in-
terest on the money withheld. 11 Williston, supra note 42, at § 1410.
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3. Avoidable Consequences
Another limitation upon the scope of damages is that a party may
not recover for consequences which he reasonably could have avoided.
The buyer of a business, for example, who, after receiving notice of
repudiation by the seller continues to enter into leases, have stationery
printed, engage employees and otherwise take steps which will be of
use only if and when the contract is performed, is likely to find that
the courts will deny him recovery for losses so incurred.
In addition to refraining from taking affirmative steps to increase
damages, the aggrieved party may not remain passive when positive
action, not involving undue expense or risk, reasonably could be
expected to limit his losses. If he fails to take such action, he may not
recover for the consequences which could have been avoided." If, for
example, the seller of a business delivers equipment warranted to be
functioning, but in fact in need of minor repairs, .the buyer may not
include in his damages losses resulting from the defect which could
have been avoided if timely repairs had been made. Similarly, if
employment contracts executed by specified employees have been
promised by the seller, but are not forthcoming, the buyer will not be
allowed to recover for the consequences of allowing the business to
collapse for lack of their services if competent substitutes could readily
have been hired; his damages would be limited to the losses that would
have been incurred through having had to employ substitutes.
4. Certainty
Another requirement of contract damages is that proof of damages
must rest on something more than mere guesswork. If the amount of
the damage claim is based entirely upon conjecture, a court will not
permit a recovery of damages as such (although specific performance
or restitution may be awarded in appropriate cases). The requirement
of certainty is often stated to be less rigid when the issue is the measure
of damages rather than whether there is a loss at all." Also, distinctions
52 See Restatement of Contracts § 336(1) (1932). The denial of consequential
damages to a buyer who fails to cover, contained in U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a), should be
regarded as a statutory application of the doctrine of avoidable consequences.
53 See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562-63
(1931); Allen v. Gardner, 126 Cal. App.2d 335, 340, 272 P.2d 99, 102 (1954). Cf. U.C.C.
§ 1-106(1) (liberal administration of remedies), and Comment 1 thereto: "LA] purpose
of subsection (1) is to reject any doctrine that damages must be calculable with
mathematical accuracy. Compensatory damages are often at best approximate: they have
to be proved with whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit, but no more."
See also U.C.C. § 2-715, Comment 4. Where defendant's breach has prevented use of a
method of valuation prescribed by the contract, the plaintiff is permitted to prove value
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are sometimes drawn between a going business and one merely about
to be launched!' Nevertheless, some degree of reasonable estimation,
as distinguished from sheer conjecture, is necessary!'
Problems of proof of damages obviously cannot be discussed in
detail in this article. The practitioner might be advised not to limit
his research to contract cases but to consider approaches employed in
other types of litigation. In business sale cases, the most troublesome
obstacle in establishing damages is likely to be proving the value of
the business being sold. Counsel should consider techniques used in
determining the valuation of a business in other situations such as
condemnation, dissolution of a partnership, appraisal of the interest of
a minority stockholder, civil antitrust actions, and cases involving the
tort of interfering with business relationships."
In some instances, when a plaintiff's case for damages will other-
wise fail because of lack of certainty, another approach may be adopted
to give some measure of relief, even if not a completely satisfactory
one. For example, where the profits from a piece of property cannot
be computed, a court may award instead its rental value or interest on
the value of the property!' For example, in one action by the buyer
for specific performance of a contract to sell a business, the court, in
determining damages for the period until compliance, used as a mea-
sure the difference between the rental cost of the property to be con-
veyed and its value as a motion picture theatre!"
Another substitute measure of damages where the value of
defendant's performance is too speculative for determination is the
loss incurred by the plaintiff. For example, where the plaintiff sold a
going business to order to move to another state to become half owner
of the defendant's business, the defendant breached, and the profits of
the business to be acquired were regarded as not sufficiently ascertain-
able to establish a measure of recovery, the court allowed as damages
the loss incurred by the plaintiff in disposing of his previous business."
by other means. Cf. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Schlottman, 218 F. 353,
355 (2d Cir. 1914).
" See Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, 206 Md. 610, 618-19, 112 A.2d
901, 904-05 (1955) ; 5 Corbin, supra note 50, at 1 1023.
55
 Restatement of Contracts 1 331(1) (1932). "It is not merely milkmaids who
have rosy dreams as to the large gains to be made by selling the chickens to be hatched
from the eggs to be bought with the price of the milk that was spilled by the defendant."
5 Corbin, supra note 50, at 1 1022.
56 For suggested methods for proving lost profits, see 11 Williston, supra note 42,
§ 1346A.
57 Restatement of Contracts 1 331(2) (1932).
58
 Loomis v. Eaton, 183 N.Y.S. 705 (Sup. Ct. Sp. Term 1920).
59 Overstreet v. Merritt, 186 Cal. 494, 200 P. 11 (1921).
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5. Preparation Expenses
Courts will also award, as part of a damage remedy, the expendi-
tures incurred by the plaintiff in preparation for, or in part perfor-
mance of, the contract." Such awards are subject to the limitations
that they must not give rise to duplications and that the relationship
between the expenditures and the contract is sufficiently close that
they might truly be taken into account in computing the profits
from the contract, rather than being regarded as expenditures for the
general purposes of the plaintiff's business!'
6. Lawyers' Fees
While broad statements may often be encountered to the effect
that lawyers' fees are never included as part of damages unless spe-
cifically agreed upon in the contract itself," the general rule is subject
to some necessary qualification. The expenses incurred by a plaintiff
in suing a defendant for breach of contract normally are not recover-
able in American law unless expressly provided for in the contract."
Lawyers' fees may be incurred for other purposes, however. If, for
example, there is a warranty that the business being sold has no
outstanding debts or taxes against it, and if the buyer is presented
with such a claim and has to defend it, reasonable legal expenses
incident to the defense may well be appropriate for inclusion in the
measure of damages along with the amount actually paid to the
creditor." Depending upon the language of the warranty, however,
the plaintiff may not be free to engage his own attorney for this
purpose without first serving upon the defendant a demand that the
defendant undertake the defense of the case."
7. Liquidated Damages
Quite frequently in contracts for the sale of a business, the parties
provide for liquidated damages in the event of certain breaches. Such
provisions, where valid, are applied to fix the measure of damages,
replacing the elements that would otherwise go into the court's deter-
mination of the amount of recovery.
Despite the lip-service generally accorded the notion of freedom
of contract, reflected in a tendency to permit parties of comparatively
00 See Lieberman v. Templar Motor Co., 236 N.Y. 139, 149, 140 N.E. 222, 225
(1923) ; Overstreet v. Merritt, 186 Cal. 494, 200 P. 11 (1921).
01 See 5 Corbin, supra note 50, at § 1031.
62 See, e.g., 22 Am. Jur.2d Damages § 165 (1965).
e3 This is subject to an exception, of course, for taxable costs.
04 Verhagen v. Platt, 1 N.J. 85, 61 A.2d 892 (1948) ; see also 5 Corbin, supra note
50, at § 1037; Restatement of Contracts § 334 (1932).
ee See 5 Corbin, supra note 50, at § 1037; Restatement of Contracts § 334 (1932).
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equal bargaining power to make almost any sort of agreement they
choose, liquidated damages clauses are closely weighed and often found
wanting. Courts must satisfy themselves that the clause in question is
a genuine effort to establish a fair measure of damages, rather than an
attempt to coerce performance through the threat of a crippling liabil-
ity." Where the clause is sustained the courts will call it a "liquidated
damages" provision, and when it is voided they will refer to it as a
"penalty," but these labels are no more than expressions of the conclu-
sions reached.
In this area, as in so many others, there is no precise formula by
which to identify the clause which will be upheld as distinguished from
the one which will be stricken. Militating in favor of upholding a
provision will be such factors as a measure of recovery within the
general range of the damages which might be anticipated, the fact that
computation or proof of the precise damage would probably be difficult,
and the lack of any indication of intention to coerce performance
through imposition of disproportionately harsh damages. A penalty
would be characterized by the reverse of some or all of these elements.
In addition, where a contract provides for the same measure of
liquidated damages for any breach, whether trivial or substantial,"
courts frequently seize upon this fact as evidence of a lack of genuine
intention to liquidate the damages, and will either void the entire
clause or, in some cases, construe it as applicable only to the more
serious breaches." Thus, if a contract for the sale of a business for
$1,000,000 provided for liquidated damages in the amount of $500,000
in the event of the buyer's total breach, this sum would appear to be
on the high side, although one could not tell for certain that it was
out of line without further information as to the availability of buyers,
fluctuations in the selling price of similar businesses, probable difficul-
ties in determining or proving damages, and so forth. If, however, the
clause also provided for the same $500,000 sum regardless of whether
the breach were a total repudiation of the agreement or the delay of
one day in readiness to close, a strong case for invalidation as a penalty
would be made."
60 See generally Restatement of Contracts 339 (1932) ; 5 Corbin, supra note 50,
at 11$ 1054-075.
fir Such provisions are sometimes referred to as "blunderbuss" or "shotgun" clauses,
depending upon the ballistic preferences of the writer.
08
 In Hackenheimer v. Kurtzmann, 235 N.Y. 57, 138 N.E. 735 (1923), liquidated
damages of $50,000 for any breach of a contract to sell a business for $130,000 were
upheld where the breach was one of a covenant by the seller not to compete and the
court construed the clause as applicable only to serious breaches.
69
 A provision for damages of $6,200 for a breach at any time of a covenant not
to compete, where the purchase price of the business was $12,500, was held invalid on
this theory, since the contract prescribed the same measure of damages regardless of
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Section 2-7 1 8( 1) of the Uniform Commercial Code has made a
minor modification in the common law rules concerning liquidated
damages. It requires that the amount be "reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach. . . ." (Emphasis
added.) Prior to adoption of the Code, the usual rule was to evaluate
the liquidated damages clause only in the light of circumstances known
at the time of entering into the contract. It remains to be seen whether
the courts will apply the more permissive standard enunciated in the
Code by analogy to cases other than those involving the sale of goods."
In view of the difficulties frequently encountered in establishing
actual damages,71 as well as uncertainty as to the availability of specific
performance," liquidated damages clauses, if carefully drawn, can be
extremely useful to either or both of the parties to a business sale
agreement. If the reported cases are an indication, however, such
clauses are most frequently used in business sale cases in connection
with a covenant by the seller or its principals not to compete with
the business being sold." It may be noted that most of the liquidated
damages cases cited above arose out of violations of covenants of this
sort."
Other uses of liquidated damages clauses in connection with
ancillary aspects of the sale of a business include their application to
a covenant not to reveal trade secrets or to use trademarks or trade
names of the business being sold."
A related question arises in what might be called "underliquidated
damages." If the agreement provides a measure of damages grossly
when the competition occurred. Mount Airy Milling & Grain Co. v. Runkles, 118 Md.
371, 84 A. 533 (1912). But cf. Robbins v. Plant, 174 Ark. 639, 297 S,W. 1027 (1927),
upholding liquidated damages of $10,000 for entry within 20 years into competition with
a business sold for only $iopoo. And in Buckhout v. Witwer, 157 Mich. 406, 122 N.W.
184 (1909),, damages set at a fixed amount per year of competition were nevertheless
held to be a penalty, and were thus not a bar to a suit for specific performance of the
Contract.
70 See pp. 828-29 supra.
71 See pp. 839-44 supra.
72 See pp. 856-61 infra.
78
 Discussed generally in 5 Corbin, supra note 50, at § 1071. Such clauses must be
drafted to comply with the general principles as to the validity of liquidated damages
clauses; covenants not to compete must also limit the range of the restriction, in both
space and time, to what is reasonably necessary to assure the purchaser that he will in
fact acquire the goodwill for which he is bargaining. If a covenant is unreasonably
broad, a court might strike it down as against public policy, perhaps labeling it an un-
reasonable restraint of trade, or it might uphold it pro tanto. 2 Restatement of Contracts
§ 515-16 (1932) ; cf. Bradshaw v. Millikin, 173 N.C. 432, 92 S.E. 161 (1917) (sale of
barbershop; agreement not to compete for two years upheld against contention it was
unreasonable restraint of competition). This is an application of a common law principle
antedating the antitrust laws but reflecting related concepts of public policy.
74 See notes 67-68 supra.
75 E.g., Tode v. Gross, 127 N.Y. 480, 28 N.B. 469 (1891).
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inadequate to compensate the aggrieved party, there may be questions
of public policy as to whether it should be applied," but the problem
is a different one from that of the "penalty," since the purpose of the
clause cannot be to coerce performance. Comment 1 to Section 2-718
of the Code states:
A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is ex-
pressly made void as a penalty. An unreasonably small
amount would be subject to similar criticism and might be
stricken under the section on unconscionable contracts or
clauses.
It is not at all clear that the comment is correct in stating that the
unreasonably small amount would be subject to "similar criticism,"
but an argument that the clause is suspect nevertheless may well be
persuasive. In addition to the section on unconscionability (2-302)
referred to, a party seeking to void an "underliquidated damages"
clause might find support in section 2-719(2), which reads: "Where
circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act."
Still another variation of the liquidated-damages-versus-penalty
problem is the question whether a defaulting buyer would forfeit any
payments he had already made (or the rarer case of a forfeiture of
initial installments of stock or assets delivered by a subsequently
defaulting seller). There was a substantial body of law in the last
century, vestiges of which still remain, to the effect that a defaulting
party to a contract would lose whatever part performance he had
rendered—in particular, part payment of the price by a buyer."
Despite the obvious similarity between permitting forfeiture of
part payments on the one hand and enforcement of penalty clauses on
the other, there was, for a considerable time, little attention paid by
the courts to their inconsistency in treatment of the two situations.
Part payments were held forfeited even though there was no reference
to such a consequence in the agreement, and regardless of whether the
amount of the forfeiture, if specifically included in the agreement as an
attempt at liquidating damages, would clearly have been regarded as a
penalty.
This doctrine of forfeiture has been whittled away both by statute
78 Corbin regards such clauses as generally valid, on the ground that they serve as
a legitimate limitation upon the risk assumed by a party to a contract, except in cases
of disparate bargaining power. 5 Corbin, supra note 50, § 1068.
77 E.g., Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N.Y. 131 (1681); see 5 Corbin, supra note 50, at
1075 and cases cited therein.
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and judicial decision," but in many states it is not yet completely
eradicated. At least with respect to the sale of goods, New York
changed the rule in 1952, providing that upon the buyer's default the
seller could retain either such amount as was provided for by a valid
liquidated damages clause, or in the absence thereof, twenty percent
of the value of the total performance.7° This provision has now been
superseded by Section 2-718(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which is modeled upon the New York statute but establishes a ceiling
of twenty percent or $500, whichever is less." This clearly changes
the old rule, where it still existed, with respect to transactions in goods,
but whether it will be applied by the courts by way of analogy to other
cases remains to be seen. Certainly, more clearly than many other
more technical provisions of Article 2 of the Code, this change seems
to evidence a legislative policy which should commend itself to the
courts in situations to which it is not literally applicable. However,
since part payments by buyers before closing are fairly rare, this
particular problem may not arise frequently in business sale cases.
8. Miscellaneous
Where the buyer has a claim for damages—for example, for
breach of warranty—and there remain unpaid installments of the pur-
chase price, the buyer may assert his claim by way of recoupment or
as a counterclaim to reduce the installment payments due or to recover
for any excess."
Punitive damages are normally not awarded in any case involving
mere breach of contract" in the absence of fraud.
Where the plaintiff has established the fact of breach but cannot
substantiate the amount of injury, courts will usually award nominal
damages, sometimes as a basis for the award of costs."
78 See the interesting discussion of this problem by Judge Clark in Amtorg Trading
Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953).
78 Upon the recommendation of the Law Revision Commission, Section 145-a was
inserted in the N.Y. Personal Property Law, following Section 145, which corresponded
to Section 64 of the Uniform Sales Act. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law 145, 145-a (McKinney
1962).
88 So small a forfeiture would be virtually meaningless in a typical business sale
case, but it must be remembered that all of the other remedies for breach of contract,
including any valid liquidated damages clause agreed upon by the parties, would still
be available.
81 Where the seller of a "camp" (consisting of cabins, a cafe, a garage, boats, and
so forth) had misstated earnings, the Supreme Court of Arkansas stated that the buyer
had a choice of (1) "rescinding" and by returning or offering to return the business to
the seller, recovering what he has paid on the contract, (2) retaining the business and
suing for damages, or (3) pleading the breach, when sued for unpaid installments, as
a deduction from the amount due. The choice by the buyer of the last of these alter-
natives was upheld in Kotz v. Rush, 218 Ark. 692, 238 S.W.2d 634 (1951).
82 Restatement of Contracts § 342 (1932).
es Restatement of Contracts I 328 (1932).
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E. Restitution
1. Generally
Restitution, an alternative remedy for breach of contract, may be
sought instead of damages. While the purpose of awarding damages is
to put the aggrieved party as nearly as possible in the position he would
have been in if the contract had been performed, restitution is intended,
instead, to restore the plaintiff, as far as can be done, to his position
before he started performance." The prevailing plaintiff is normally
given back whatever performance of his obligations under the contract
he had rendered, either in kind or by way of monetary equivalent.
Thus, restitution would have no place in a contract that was entirely
executory; only those plaintiffs who had paid, or transferred, or done
something in performance would even consider weighing the possible
advantages of restitution against damages, as a remedy for breach.
In business sale cases, restitution might take any of several forms.
Upon the seller's material breach—for example, his breach of an
important warranty—a buyer who had paid part or all of the purchase
price could offer back anything he had received from the seller and
demand the return of what he had paid." If the seller had transferred
assets of the business to the buyer, who then was in serious default
in making payments, the seller could offer back any payments he had
received and demand return of such assets as could be conveyed back
readily and the cash equivalent of those that could not.
2. Rescission
Confusion often arises from the use of the word "rescission" to
designate the remedy just described; this use of the word alone would
be harmless, resulting only in a choice of two words for one concept."
Unfortunately, "rescission" is also the term used to denote the complete
cancellation of the contract by agreement of the parties, with all claims
under it extinguished. When rescission is used in this manner, whatever
rights either party might have to recover for his own performance
necessarily would depend on the terms of the rescission agreement. 87
When rescission is used as a synonym for the remedy of restitution,
84 Restatement of Contracts 347, Comment b (1932).
85 E.g., where payment for a business had been made in promissory notes rather
than cash, and they had not been negotiated to a holder in due course, the seller was
ordered to return the notes for cancellation. Giotis v. Lampkin, '145 A.2d 779 (D.C.
Mun. Ct. App. 1958).
85 Cf. note 67 supra.
87 Where a down payment had been made on the purchase of a retail store, and
the parties later mutually agreed to rescind without specifically referring to repayment,
it was held that the buyer was not entitled to restitution of what he had paid. Mc-
Kinney v. Jones, 210 Ark. 912, 198 S.W.2d 415 (1946).
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however, the rights generated are not dependent upon agreement be-
tween the parties, but devolve upon the injured party by operation of
law."
These semantic difficulties are largely avoided in the Uniform
Commercial Code. For example, instead of "rescinding," a buyer
"rejects"" or "revokes acceptance.'" In addition, parties are saved
from the pitfalls arising from improvident use of terms like "rescission"
by a provision that such terms generally shall not be construed to
constitute a renunciation of rights." While the Restatement" and
Corbin" call the remedy "restitution," and Williston" refers to "rescis-
sion and restitution," it is still frequently referred to as "rescission"
by the courts."
3. Restitution Cannot Be Combined With Damages or Specific Per-
formance
Since restitution is intended to nullify the effect of the contract as
far as possible, while both damages and specific performances are
remedies predicated upon the notion of giving to the contract as nearly
as possible its intended full effect, it is generally said that the plaintiff
cannot recover for both restitution and damages or both restitution and
specific performance."
Here, too, confusion may arise from semantic difficulties. If,
because of a breach of warranty, a buyer of a business suffers losses
in trying to operate it, he may sue for restitution, tendering back the
business and recovering his purchase price, and also receive compensa-
tion for his losses." The latter element in his recovery is often referred
to as "damages," and the erroneous conclusion has been drawn, there-
fore, that a party may obtain both restitution and damages. It should
be noted, however, that the so-called "damages" in this instance are
part of the process of putting the plaintiff in the financial position he
had been in prior to the contract; they are not true "damages,"
88 See 5 Corbin, supra note 50, at § 1105; cf. 5A Corbin § 1131.
89 U.C.C. § 2-601.
99 U.C.C. § 2-608.
01 U.C.C. § 2-720.
92 Restatement of Contracts §§ 347-57 (1932).
93 5, 5A Corbin, supra note 50, at chs. 61-62.
94 12 Williston on Contracts ch. 44 (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Williston].
95 It is sometimes sought to justify the use of the word "rescission" in this context
on the basis that a default sufficiently vital to justify restitution will also permit the
innocent party to stop performing and treat the contract as totally halted. This still
does not justify using "rescission" to describe the remedy of restitution, since the plain-
tiff may in such circumstances nevertheless elect to sue for damages instead.
°° See 12 Williston, supra note 94, at § 1464; 5A Corbin, supra note 50, at §§ 1223-
224 ; Nelson v. Spence, 182 Cal. App.2d 493, 498, 6 Cal. Rptr. 312, 315 (1960).
97 HirSh011 v. Whelan, 122 A.2d 114 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1956).
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intended to put him in the position he would have been in if the contract
had been performed."
While the inconsistency between restitution and specific perfor-
mance seems inescapable,°° the objection to awarding both damages
and restitution—once the possibility of double recovery for the same
wrong is eliminated—seems largely conceptualistic."° That this as-
serted mutual exclusivity is not inevitable may be seen in certain of
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code allowing the buyer of
goods both remedies."' If the buyer had paid part or all of the price,
and the seller either fails to deliver or the goods are not in conformity
with the contract (for example, because of a breach of warranty) so
as to permit rejection or revocation of acceptance, the buyer may
recover both the amount he has paid and damages for his lost bar-
gain 102
 Whether these provisions will be influential in cases not involv-
ing the sale of goods remains to be seen.
4. Restitution Is Available Only for "Total" Breach
Damages, in some amount, are normally appropriate for any
breach. Even if the breach is a trivial one, the innocent party neverthe-
less has a cause of action if he cares to pursue it, and may recover
damages in an appropriate amount for his consequent loss. For example,
where time is not of the essence, and the seller of a business is one
week late in being ready to close, the buyer may, if he can show
consequent loss, be awarded damages for the delay, even though the
98 Thus, in Hirshon v. Whelan, 122 A.2d 114 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1956), a claimed
item for lost profits was not allowed. See also Mahurin v. Schmeck, 95 Ariz. 333, 342,
390 P.2d 576, 582 (1964). Where the seller failed to disclose the interest of a third party,
which materially impaired the goodwill of the business, and also failed to deliver im-
portant records, the buyer was permitted to rescind the purchase, return the business
to the seller, get back the purchase price, and also be paid for services rendered to the
business during her management of it, but was not awarded damages for her lost bargain.
99 See 5A Corbin, supra note 50, at § 1224.
100 Compare SA Corbin, supra note 50, at § 1223 with 12 Willison, supra note 94,
at § 1464.
101
 The seller of goods is almost never entitled to restitution. Since the seller's per-
formance normally takes the form of delivery, a breach by the buyer before the seller
delivers entitles the seller to either damages (U.C.C. H 2-706, 2-708) or, in an ap-
propriate case, the price (U.C.C. § 2-709), but there has been no performance at that
point for which the seller is entitled to restitution. Once the goods are delivered, as a
matter of substantive law, the seller is not permitted to reclaim them, except in such
limited situations as stoppage in transit (U.C.C. 2-702), and where agreed between the
parties as in a conditional sale.
102 U.C.C. §I 2-711(1), 2-712, 2-713. These provisions reverse the rule under § 69
of the Uniform Sales Act, which provided that where the buyer "rescinded" a purchase
of goods for breach of warranty, he was denied all other remedies. New York had
modified this provision in 1948 to allow damages in just such a situation, in the revised
N.Y. Prop. Law § 150(1)(d) (McKinney 1962), now superseded in turn by the Uni-
form Commercial Code. See also U.C.C. 2-721.
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contract as a whole is not destroyed. Restitution, on the other hand, is
permitted only in the case of total breach.'" "Total breach," however,
is a phrase of art and does not necessarily mean that the breaching
party has failed to render even the slightest portion of his agreed
performance.1" For example, even though the business has been trans-
ferred, a breach of a material warranty may be sufficient to justify
the buyer in returning the business and recovering the consideration
which he had paid."
5. Timeliness of Demand
A limitation upon the availability of restitution is that unlike
damages, which normally can be sought at any time until the statute of
limitations has run, restitution must be demanded with reasonable
promptness. Even though restitution is not purely of equitable ori-
gin,'" a doctrine akin to laches is generally invoked to deny this
remedy to one who has not moved with reasonable promptness.'"
A delay occasioned by reasonable reliance upon reassurances
given by the other party, however, will not bar restitution. Thus, the
103 Restatement of Contracts § 347, Comment e (1932); Long v. Long, 121 S.W.2d
800 (Mo. 1938) (buyer of warehouse business failed to make a small part of the pay-
ments called for by the contract of sale; held insufficient ground for seller to treat
contract as terminated and insist on restitution). See also Royal Hair Pin Corp. v.
Rieser Co., 18 App. Div.2d 925, 238 N.Y.S.2d 310 (2d Dep't 1963), appeal dismissed,
13 N.Y.2d 1044, 195 N.E.2d -317 (1963) (minor failure as to record keeping alternative
ground for refusal to permit restitution).
104 See Restatement of Contracts 11 275, 276, 313 (1932). Compare the test for
determining the right of the aggrieved party to refuse to perform. See pp. 837-38 supra.
105 E.g., Mahurin v. Schmeck, 95 Ariz. 333, 390 P.2d 576 (1964), discussed at note
98 supra; Campbell v. Pollack, 101 R.I. 223, 221 A.2d 615 (1966) (breach of warranty
of title as to about 10% of assets of car wash business sold, held sufficient to justify
revocation of acceptance under U.C.C. 1 2-608; Giotis v. Lampkin, 145 A.2d 779 (D.C.
Mun. Ct. App. 1958) (breach of covenant not to compete held ground for restitution
in contract for sale of business); Lockwood v. Christakos, 181 F.2d 805, 807 (D.C. Cir.
1950) (dictum to the effect that even innocent breach of warranty as to gross receipts
of sandwich shop would be sufficient for restitution).
100 See 5 Corbin on Contracts 1103 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Corbin].
107 Williston, supra note 94, at § 1469; Royal Hair Pin Corp. v. Rieser Co., 38 App.
Div.2d 925, 238 N.Y.S.2d 310 (2d Dep't 1963), appeal dismissed, 13 N.Y.2d 1044, 195
N.E.2d 317 (1963) (lapse of five and one-half years and intervening demand by plain-
tiff for arbitration were bar to obtaining rescission); Sy-Jo Luncheonette, Inc. v. Marsav
Distribs. Inc., 279 App. Div. 715, 108 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd, 304 N.Y.
747, 108 N.E.2d 614 (1952) (operation of business by buyer for two months after
he learned of asserted misrepresentations barred rescission). This principle is illustrated
rather dramatically in the recent case of American Container Corp. v. Hanley Trucking
Corp., 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1301 (N.J. Super. 1970). A sold a semi-trailer to B, erroneously
believing that he had good title to it. B sold it to C. The true owner then laid claim to
the semi-trailer, and it was seized by the police. C promptly notified B, but B failed to
give prompt notification to A. All three parties were before the court. It was held that
C was entitled to restitution from B in the amount of the purchase price less the value
of its use while he had possession. It was also held, however, that B's delay in informing
A precluded restitution, thus limiting B to a cause of action for damages.
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buyer of a vending machine business was held entitled to revoke the
transaction and recover his payments because of misstatements as to
the earnings of the business, even though he had continued to make
installment payments after knowledge of the discrepancy. The decisive
factor in the decision was the buyer's reliance upon explanations given
him by the seller when the inaccuracies were pointed oue° 8
6. Measure of Recovery
If the plaintiff's performance has taken the form of a payment of
money—which is frequently the situation where a business buyer seeks
restitution for the seller's breach—it is fairly easy to compute the
amount of the recovery on the basis of money paid plus interest. When
the plaintiff's performance is of a non-pecuniary nature, however, com-
plications arise. For example, an aggrieved seller demanding return of
assets, part of which had been consumed or sold (for example, raw
materials and inventory) might encounter problems of valuation not
unlike those faced in proving damages.'" Similarly, where restitution
is sought by a buyer which has paid for a business in its own corporate
stock, mere redelivery of the stock may not be a proper remedy because
the value of the stock, and sometimes the structure of the issuing cor-
poration, may have changed greatly in the interim.
7. Plaintiff's Obligation To Restore Consideration Received by Him
To be entitled to restitution, a plaintiff usually must offer to
return whatever he has received from the defendant,"° or its pecuniary
value if it cannot be returned in kind or if interim changes would render
its return unfair to either party. Thus, a seller of a business who has
received part or all of the price (whether in money or in stock) from
the buyer who later breaches, must offer to return it (or, in appropriate
cases, credit it against what is claimed from the buyer). 1 " Also, an
aggrieved buyer who demands restitution of the part of the price he
has paid must offer to return the business property that had been
transferred to him, and furthermore, must offer to credit the seller
with profits made from the business while it was in the buyer's hands." 2
108 Parker v. Johnston, 244 Ark. 355, 426 S.W.2d 155 (1968).
109 See 5 Corbin, supra note 106, at § 1112.
110 2 Restatement of Contracts 349 (1932).
111 Cf. 2 Restatement of Contracts § 349(2)(c) (1932).
112 See 5 Corbin, supra note 106, at 	 1115; Mahurin v. Schmeck, 95 Ariz. 333,
390 P.2d 576 (1964). Against these profits, buyer can claim compensation for his services.
Id. at 582. The same case also holds that a formal tender of the property is not required,
and that the offer to return it may be conditional upon return by the defendant of
plaintiff's consideration. Id. at 581. Accord, Restatement of Contracts § 349(3) (1932).
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However, where the reason for restitution also prevents return of the
property received, and either destroys its value or otherwise renders it
inequitable to require return of the equivalent in money, neither return
of the property nor payment to the defendant of its value will be
required. 113
8. Specific Restitution
Where property has been delivered which may have a value to
the plaintiff not readily translatable into money, and where it may
be returned without destroying it, the plaintiff may demand specific
restitution—an order requiring redelivery in kind. 114 This is an equita-
ble remedy comparable to specific performance, except that here the
contract is sought to be terminated, rather than enforced. Thus, if a
buyer makes part payment for the seller's business in the buyer's own
stock, the seller then defaults, and the stock is not readily available on
the market, or is of a quantity too large to be acquired without distort-
ing the market price, or is important for the buyer's control of the
corporation, a decree for specific restitution might be appropriate.
9. Choice of Restitution or Damages
In electing whether he stands to gain more from damages on the
one hand or restitution on the other, the aggrieved party must consider
a number of factors. Since most contracts are entered into on the
supposition that they will prove to be profitable, there will undoubtedly
be many cases in which the plaintiff would have gained a substantial
benefit from the bargain and would presumptively do better by seeking
damages.'" Therefore, a decisive factor in such cases would probably
be whether the plaintiff can meet the necessary level of certainty in
establishing his damages.'" If damages are likely to be of a highly
speculative nature, so that there would be a substantial danger of
inadequate recompense on a damage theory, and if all of the require-
ments for restitution can readily be met, prudence may dictate that the
plaintiff pursue restitution instead, and accept the next best remedy—
the restoration to his position before he entered into the contract.
113 An example would be the breach of warranty of title as to goods sold; where
the goods are seized by the true owner, the plaintiff is entitled to restitution of his pay-
ments, less the value of their use while he had them, with no obligation to return either
the goods or their value. American Container Corp. v. Hanley Trucking Corp., 7 U.C.C.
Rep. 1301 (N.J. Super. 1970).
114 Restatement of Contracts § 354 (1932).
115 Unless the requirement of foreseeability limited the measure of damages. See
p. 842 supra.
ne see pp. 843-44 supra.
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F. Specific Performance
1. Generally
As stated above,' specific performance and restitution appear to
be mutually exclusive. In some circumstances, however, damages may
accompany specific performance. Although one cannot receive damages
for that portion of a breach which a specific performance decree
prevents from happening,'" in most cases there will be a period of
breach until the decree is issued, and for that period damages may also
be recovered.118 For example, where a party breaks a covenant not to
compete and the covenant is specifically enforced, the plaintiff may
recover damages for the prohibited competition from the time of its
commencement until it was brought to a halt. 12°
2. Adequacy of Remedy at Law
In Anglo-American law, specific performance is an exceptional,
rather than ordinary, remedy. It is grant&I only when the remedy at
law is not adequate. But each business is unique in many respects,
and where there is a wrongful refusal to close, a business buyer should
normally have a strong argument that a mere monetary award is not
the equivalent of specific relief. The seller's position is somewhat
weaker at least where the consideration to be paid to him is only money,
but still, unless at least one substitute buyer is available, the seller can
argue persuasively that mere damages are not likely to serve as an
adequate replacement for his lost sale.121 Traditionally, specific perfor-
mance has always been available to either party to a contract to sell
real estate,' and if a major part of the property being sold in a sale-of-
'
117 See p. 851 supra.
118 See Bradshaw v. MiIlikin, 173 N.C. 432, 92 S.E. 161 (1917) (specific performance
of breach of covenant not to compete granted, liquidated damages not awarded in ad-
dition).
119 See Annot., Awarding Damages for Delay, in Addition to Specific Performance,
of Contract for Sale of Corporate Stock, 28 A.L.R.3d 1401 (1969).
129 Loomis v. Hailston, 183 N.Y.S. 705 (Sup. Ct. Sp. Term 1920).
121
 A rough analogy may be found in U.C.C. •§ 2-709(1) (b), which permits the
seller to sue for the price of goods (as distinguished from mere damages) "if the seller
is unable after reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing." The uncertainties as to the
measure of damages so likely in many business sale cases (see pp. 839-44 supra) would
seem to make the argument for specific enforcement in such cases even stronger than
that in most situations involving the sale of goods.
122 See 5A Corbin, supra note 106, at §f 1143, 1145. The rule as to land contracts
is probably based upon the uniqueness of any parcel of land as well as the special im-
portance of land in the English economy during the formative period of equity. This
may explain the right of the purchaser to specific performance, but does not completely
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assets transaction is real property, specific performance will probably
be granted at the instance of either party in the event of a breach by
the other. Where the sale is one of stock, there is a general rule that
specific performance will not be granted, at least if there is a ready
market for the stock. 123
 For the purposes of this article, however, we
are considering by hypothesis a sale of all of a corporation's stock, or
at least a sale of enough shares to ensure corporate control; in such a
case, an exception to the general rule would be invoked.'"
3. Doctrines of Equity
Specific performance, an equitable remedy, is of course subject
to all of the usual equitable doctrines, such as the requirement that the
plaintiff come in with clean hands. Unfairness and overreaching may
induce a court to refuse to award specific performance even if the
activities involved are not sufficiently extreme to prevent imposition of
remedies at law.'" in addition, if a defaulting seller has sold the same
business to a bona fide purchaser for value, the latter's equities would
be sufficiently strong to prevent the buyer from obtaining specific
performance, and he would be relegated to his legal remedies.lae
4. Specific Relief at Law
There are certain circumstances in which specific relief, com-
parable to specific performance but rendered at law, may be available.
Before the Uniform Commercial Code, a seller of goods could obtain
the price of the goods (as distinguished from damages) if the property
interest in the goods had passed to the buyer.'" While this rule has been
abandoned by the Code, it has been replaced by authorization for
recovery of the price if the goods have been accepted by the buyer or
if the seller is unable to resell them at a reasonable price. 128 Thus, if
the seller has delivered and the buyer has not paid, the right of the
account for the fact that this remedy is also available to the vendor, who might be ex-
pected to be adequately compensated by damages.
A notion of "affirmative mutuality"—that if one party would be entitled to specific
performance, the other also is, even though nothing in the circumstances would other-
wise call for it—has fallen into disrepute; the case of the vendor of land may be its last
surviving application. See 2 Restatement of Contracts 372(2) (1932).
123 See SA Corbin, supra note 106, at $ 1148.
124
 Armstrong v. Stuffier, 189 Md. 630, 56 A.2d 808 (1948); see also SA Corbin,
supra note 106, at $ 1148 and cases cited therein.
125 See 5A Corbin, supra note 106, at 1$ 1164-165.
120 See 5A Corbin, supra note 106, at f 1169. For an interesting catalogue of reasons
for refusing specific performance, see 5A Corbin ch. 64.
127 Uniform Sales Act 63(1).
128 U.C.C. 2-709,
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seller to damages in the amount of the agreed price is the equivalent
of specific performance. Similarly, the buyer, who under prior law
could replevy the goods from the seller if the property had passed to
him,129 may now do so if he is unable to effect cover for the goods.'"
In business sale situations, in which a party would have been able
to obtain specific relief at law if the sale had been one of goods, a
court might be persuaded to apply the Uniform Commercial Code by
analogy.lal At least, it would seem worthwhile for counsel to try the
argument, as a second string to his bow, where his right to specific
performance in equity seems uncertain.
5. Effect of a Liquidated Damages Clause
The question sometimes arises as to whether specific performance
is appropriate where there is a liquidated damages clause. The argu-
ment may be made that the parties have determined for themselves
an appropriate remedy for breach, that by virtue of their agreement
this is an adequate remedy, and that, therefore, specific performance
is not appropriate.
This argument has found little favor with the courts in recent
years. It is rebutted by the analysis that, in liquidating damages, the
parties have attempted to produce a fairer and more readily adminis-
tered measure of damages than the courts would be able to devise, but
still not one that purported to give the parties the equivalent of actual
performance.'" While the courts generally reach this conclusion with-
out help from the contract language, a provision expressly stating that
the liquidated damages clause was not intended to bar specific perfor-
mance might insure this result.
As pointed out above," 3
 there are a number of business sale cases
involving covenants not to compete, with liquidated damages clauses
incidental thereto. Provided the other requirements for equitable relief
are met, specific performance is normally appropriate in such a case.' 34
It might be added that if the liquidated damages clause is invalid as
a penalty, the case for specific performance is even stronger, since the
argument that a liquidated damages clause precludes specific perfor-
mance, weak enough if the clause is valid, would seem hopeless if the
clause is voided.'"
129 Uniform Sales Act § 66.
130 U.C.C. § 2-716(3).
131 See pp. 828-31 supra.
132 See 2 Restatement of Contracts § 378 (1932) ; 5A Corbin, supra note 106, at
§ 1213.
133 See p. 847 supra.
134 Bradshaw v. Millikin, 173 N.C. 432, 92 S.E. 161 (1917).
135 Buck.hout v. Witwer, 157 Mich. 406, 122 N.W. 184 (1909). In Bauer v. Sawyer,
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Occasionally, whether as the result of deliberate intention or poor
draftsmanship, what appears at first glance to be a liquidated damages
clause is in fact an alternate promise. 18° For example, instead of the
seller agreeing to pay $1,000 a month in liquidated damages if he
re-enters the business, the seller promises in the alternative either to
refrain from competing or pay $1,000 per month. If the agreement is
construed to bear the latter meaning, specific performance in the form
of an injunction against competition would of course be inappro-
priate."'
The emphasis in the foregoing discussion upon liquidated damages
clauses bolstering covenants not to compete is not to suggest that they
do not arise elsewhere in agreements to sell businesses. In view of the
difficulty of proving damages in many situations, a liquidated damages
clause may be a useful device, and if properly drawn will be upheld
against the claim that it is a penalty. Where specific performance is
otherwise appropriate, a liquidated damages clause will not serve to
bar that remedy.'"
6. Injunctive Relief
Although a decree for specific performance is generally expressed
in affirmative terms, directing the defendant to abide by the contract,
it will frequently contain some negative commands, and in some cases
may be entirely negative in form. For example, where a covenant not
to compete or not to reveal trade secrets is specifically enforced, the
decree of the court is normally in the form of an injunction against
committing the forbidden conduct. While a decree may be expressed
in terms of a prohibition, and properly labeled an "injunction," the
applicable doctrines are not changed by virtue of that face"
There are also distinguishable situations in which injunctive relief
is granted, not as the direct means of enforcing the contract provision,
8 I11.2d 351, 134 N.E.2d 329 (1956) (not a case involving sale of a business), the presence
of a liquidated damages clause incident to a covenant not to compete was held not to
bar specific performance, but the court went on to bolster its conclusion by demonstrating
the invalidity of the liquidated damages clause. Interestingly, the plaintiffs, in seeking
an injunction against the forbidden competition, challenged the validity of the clause,
while the defendants sought to uphold it.
138 See Holmes, J., in Smith v. Bergengren, 153 Mass. 236, 237-38, 26 N.E. 690,
691 (1891).
187 Cf. Rigs v. Sokol, 318 Mass. 337, 343, 61 N.E.2d 538, 541 (1945) (provision for
payment of $500 in event either party did not perform was construed as liquidated
damages clause rather than option to perform or pay; and held no bar to specific per-
formance). Accord, Franko v. Olszewski, 316 Mich. 485, 490, 25 N.W.2d 593, 595 (1947).
138 Specific performance was awarded in at least two business sale cases in which
there was a liquidated damages clause applicable not to a breach of a covenant to refrain
from competing but to a breach of the sale contract itself: Armstrong v. Stuffier, 189 Md.
630, 56 A.2d 808 (1948) ; Franko v. Olszewsld, 316 Mich. 485, 25 N.W.2d 593, 595 (1947).
189 Sec SA Corbin, supra note 106, at § 1138.
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but either to preserve the status quo and safeguard the jurisdiction of
the court, or as the next best alternative where affirmative enforcement
is not possible.'" Thus, it has been held appropriate, where a buyer
was granted specific performance, to include an injunction against the
seller disposing of the business to another; 141 in fact, if the buyer shows
some likelihood of such a sale being made, and if there is otherwise
some merit to his case, be can probably obtain a temporary order to
that effect even before the specific performance demand is adjudicated.
7. Miscellaneous
Where part of a promised performance cannot be rendered because
of impossibility or other legal excuse, or where part of the performance
cannot be specifically enforced because of a legal obstacle such as the
difficulty of judicial supervision of enforcement, the remainder may
nevertheless be specifically enforced, with appropriate compensation
to the plaintiff for the balance!' For example, where a substantial
part of "Luna Park," an amusement area on Coney Island, had been
destroyed by fire, and the risk of loss had remained on the seller,
specific performance of the sale contract was ordered at the instance of
the buyer, with abatement of an appropriate portion of the purchase
price!"
The fact that certain situations are mentioned herein, in which
demands for specific performance arise with comparative frequency,
should not be taken to negate the possibility of a wide range of other
possible types of breaches for which specific performance might also
be appropriate. There are a large number of collateral obligations
often assumed by parties to a business sale agreement, breach of which
would normally give rise to a persuasive case for specific performance.
Typical of these would be the promise of the seller to change its
corporate name so as to enable the buyer to enjoy its use.
It is interesting to note that there appear to be comparatively few
reported cases involving specific performance of an entire contract to
buy or sell a business,'" as distinguished from such collateral aspects
140 Thus an employment contract ancillary to the sale of a business would normally
not be specifically enforceable (Restatement of Contracts 379 (1932)), but in ap-
propriate cases a court might enjoin the employee from working for a competitor (id.
ii 380). Cf. the chick case in which such relief was granted against a repudiating concert
singer, Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G.M. & G. 604 (1852).
141 Loomis v. Hailston, 183 N.Y.S. 705 (Sup. Ct. Sp. Term 1920).
142 Restatement of Contracts 1365 (1932).
148 World Exhibit Corp. v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 186 Misc. 420, 59 N.Y.S.
2d 648 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 654, 61 N.Y.S.2d 889 (2d Dep't), aff'd,
296 N.Y. 586, 68 N.E.2d 876 (1946).
144 Even though in appropriate cases either a buyer or a seller could obtain specific
performance, the remedy is less likely to be sought by a seller, who may be completely
satisfied by an award of damages.
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thereof, such as a covenant not to compete. A partial explanation may
lie in the fact that in a substantial portion of these transactions the
agreement calls for an employment contract whereby one or more
principals of the seller are engaged for a period of time by the buyer.
Such an arrangement is sometimes a form of "sweetening" the deal
for the employees; it also may be essential, however, to the buyer to
insure continuity of management and retention of trade contacts. In
any event, once the parties have reached the stage of disagreement that
brings them into court, the likelihood of such an employment relation-
ship being tolerable to either is rather slim. This in turn may sour the
entire transaction to the point where the aggrieved party would prefer
to seek either damages or restitution rather than insist upon perfor-
mance.
G. Effect of Closing on Availability of Remedies for Breach
of Contract
The closing of a business sale contract, as with any transaction, is
a watershed event, at which point the rights of the parties may undergo
substantial change. While almost nothing has been written with respect
to the effect of a closing in the case of a sale of a business, a body of
law has developed in connection with real estate closings which may
offer helpful analogies. 145
Where a closing is total, with all of the purchase price passing to
the seller and all of the stock or assets to the buyer, the only kinds of
claims that would generally survive might be those for breaches of
warranty, which will be discussed below,'" and those for breaches of
collateral agreements such as employment contracts and covenants
not to compete. Where the closing is equally inclusive, but part or all of
the purchase price or the property is placed in escrow pending resolu-
tion of various matters, whatever additional rights and remedies might
accrue would depend upon the terms of the escrow agreement. 147 Since
these terms may vary so greatly, any attempt here at enumeration of
possibilities would be fruitless.
Where the closing is less than total, additional possibilities arise.
If, for example, part of the purchase price is to be paid in later install-
ments, the seller would have a cause of action for their payment should
the buyer default. This would be in the form of an action at law for
145 See 6 Corbin, supra note 106, at § 1319; Restatement of Contracts { 413 (1932).
For more general statements of the problem of excuse of conditions by acceptance or
retention of defective performance, see SA Corbin, supra note 106, at 4 1245; Restate-
ment of Contracts § 298 (1932).
145 See pp. 862-63 infra.
141 There may, of course, be other surviving rights of either party not covered by
the escrow agreement.
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damages, with the measure of damages being the unpaid portion of
the price, but the result could as readily be regarded as the equivalent
of specific porformance at law.
A more difficult question, however, is whether a seller who would
prefer to escape from the contract can, even at this late stage, seize
upon the buyer's breach as an excuse to demand restitution, recovering
the property or stock conveyed and returning the payments he had
received. A post-closing attempt to obtain restitution might encounter
two obstacles related to the factor of its timing.
First of all, as pointed out above, restitution is appropriate only
in instances of "total breach"'"—unlikely to occur if a substantial
part of the defendant's performance has already occurred. Usually, the
performances of both parties are likely to be almost complete at the
time of closing, although an obvious exception could arise out of a
contract calling for post-closing installment payments by the buyer.
However, even if the breach is less than material, where it is accom-
panied by a repudiation, the standard for "total breach" may still be
met, and restitution might be possible.'" Even in such instances, how-
ever, there is an exception which may bar the seller from securing
restitution where he has performed fully and the buyer's only remaining
obligation is to pay money; in such instances, perhaps for historical
rather than practical reasons, the seller is limited to suing for damages
—in this case the unpaid price—and may not opt for restitution."°
Secondly, it will be recalled that restitution is available only to a
party who has moved promptly following a breach."' While the fact of
closing may not itself prove decisive, lapse of time following knowledge
of a breach may prove fatal.
There is a greater possibility of serious post-closing breaches
arising out of non-performance of a warranty, generally on the part of
the seller. In some cases the warranty is not breached until after the
closing; in others, the breach may have occurred earlier but comes to
light only after the closing, as in the case of accounting data.'" The
question may be viewed, in part, as one concerning the extent to which
the provisions of the contract, including the warranties, are merged
into the actual sale and do not survive the closing.
Here again, the starting point is the language of the contract,
148 See pp. 852-53 supra.
149 5 Corbin, supra note 106, at § 1104; Restatement of Contracts 317 (1932).
159 5 Corbin, supra note 106, at § 1110; Restatement of Contracts § 350 (1932). If
the buyer were insolvent, however, the argument for granting the seller restitution
might be stronger.
101 See pp. 853-54 supra. Compare also the requirements of prompt notification of
breaches of contracts for the sale of goods. U.C.C. §§ 2-602, 2-605, 2-606, 2-607, 2-608.
1152 See Franck v. J.j. Sugarman-Rudolph Co., 40 Ca1.2d 81, 251 P.2d 949 (1952).
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and, in the absence of fraud, it is within the power of the parties to
write their own law as to what will and will not survive the closing.'"
In the absence of such an expression, however, ordinary principles of
construction would have to be applied; it would be obvious, for ex-
ample, that warranties as to sales or profits for a period up to, or past,
the date of closing would rarely be deemed to be cancelled by the
closing, and the case would be even clearer as to warranties as to how
the business would perform for the buyer after the closing. 154
Even where the case for survival of the warranty is less obvious,
any breaches which the aggrieved party did not know of and which he
could not have reasonably discovered at the time of the closing will
normally survive. Execution of an instrument at the closing, whereby
a party relinquishes any such claims, may achieve its purpose in some
cases, but is likely to be strictly construed by the courts and may also
be held ineffective upon a showing of fraud, mistake, or even over-
reachi ng."5
There is a separate question as to how long the parties may
contract for the survival of their warranties after closing. Normally,
a claim for breach of warranty must be asserted promptly or be lose"
The time for such communication, however, runs from discovery (or
when a reasonable person would have discovered) rather than from the
time of the contract or of the closing. Another temporal restraint on
the assertion of warranty claims is found in statutes of limitations,
which apply to the commencement of suit rather than the communica-
tion of the grievance. The parties thus may normally modify the limita-
tion period by agreement, but there are some statutory restrictions
upon freedom of contract in this respect.'"
153 See, e.g., Johnson v. Grapentien, 357 Mich. 420, 98 N.W.2d 547 (1959).
154 See Lockwood v. Christakos, 181 F.2d 805 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
155 Cf. 5A Corbin, supra note 106, at § 1245; Cawley v. Weiner, 236 N.Y. 357, 140
N.E. 724 (1923) (purchase of house).
150 See note 32 supra; Franck v. J.J. Sugarman-Rudolph Co., 40 Cal.2d 81, 251
P.2d 949 (1952).
157 With respect to the sale of goods, U.C.C. § 2-725 prescribes a four-year statute
of limitations. This applies as well to actions for breach of warranty in connection with
such sales, but in that respect, U.C.C. § 2-725(2) states: "A breach of warranty occurs
when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future
performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such per-
formance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been dis-
covered." U.C.C. § 2-725 further provides that the parties by their original agreement
may reduce the period of limitation, but to no less than one year, and may not extend
it beyond four years. Whether a court would apply any part of these limitation pro-
visions to a contract for the sale of stock or a contract for the sale of assets of which
only a portion are goods, is problematical.
If following closing there is a merger of the acquired corporation, either with the
buying company or with a subsidiary, additional complexities will arise in the pursuit
of remedies for breach of the original contract. There is authority that in some circum-
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H. Election of Remedies
At earlier stages of our jurisprudence, an elaborate body of law
developed concerning the extent to which a party choosing one of the
three principal contractual remedies—damages, specific performance,
or restitution—might be precluded from asking for one of the others.
Along with reforms in pleading and practice, the law has moved away
from creating such pitfalls for unwary lawyers and their clients.
Generally speaking, alternative and even inconsistent demands may be
made in a single complaint, and an irrevocable election occurs only if
and when the other party would be prejudiced by a change of de-
mand.158
I. Parties to the Action
Who the parties will be in an action for breach of a business sale
contract will depend largely upon the contract itself. The agreement
will designate the seller or sellers and the buyer or buyers, who, in the
absence of anything to the contrary, will normally be the parties to the
contract and the parties in any ensuing litigation. The extent of the
obligations of each of the defendants and the rights of each of the
plaintiffs may depend upon whether they are designated in the agree-
ment as joint, several, or joint and several parties.'"
If one party undertakes to secure the performance of someone
else, such as when a corporation promises to obtain a covenant from
its officers not to compete, or a principal stockholder promises to
obtain a tender of stock from minority stockholders, the party making
stances former stockholders of a merged-in corporation might bring a derivative action
against the successor corporation, with the proceeds going to those stockholders. Miller
v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Where the attack is on the merger
itself, based upon misrepresentations in the proxy materials in violation of 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) (1964), aggrieved stockholders have
a cause of action for "all necessary remedial relief" under 27 of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1964). J. I. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1964). Whether damages,
restitution, or unwinding of the merger is appropriate depends upon the facts of the case;
whether the merger should be set aside, for example, "must hinge on whether [it]
would be in the best interests of the shareholders as a whole." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388 (1970). Jurisdiction for such actions may also be found under
SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. See SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S.
453, 468-69 (1969) ; see also pp. 869-71 infra.
158 See Restatement of Contracts El 381-84 (1932).
158 The applicable law is set out in considerable detail in Restatement of Contracts
ch. 5 (1932). The principles there set forth, however, should be regarded only as guide-
lines for construction of the contract language, and any clear expression by the parties
would be decisive. In the commonly encountered situation in which each of the stock-
holders of the selling corporation simply promises to sell his shares, the agreement may
well be construed to treat their obligations as several but not joint, and if one of them
failed to perform, the others might not be held liable for breach. If it is intended that
each selling stockholder should assume responsibility that all tender their shares, this should
be made dear in the agreement
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the promise will of course be responsible for its performance.'" Gen-
erally speaking, if one person promises that another will act or forbear
in a specified fashion, the promisor assumes responsibility for that
performance.'"
There may be instances in which rights may accrue to a non-party,
either on a third party beneficiary theory, or otherwise. For example,
where the transaction is in the form 'of the sale of stock, the corpora-
tion involved may have certain rights against the seller if benefits
which the seller has promised to confer upon the corporation being
sold are not given in fact. Similarly, where, as part of the agreement,
either party promises to pay debts owed to creditors of the business,
the latter may enforce that promise as third party beneficiaries."'
Apart from the parties to the agreement, other persons associated
with them (particularly with the seller), may be subjected to possible
tort liability in certain instances. Attorneys and accountants partic-
ipating in misrepresentations may themselves be liable for common law
fraud, negligent misrepresentation,'" or violation of the securities
VI. REMEDIES FOR MISREPRESENTATION
A. Restitution
Where a party has been induced to enter into a contract through
the material misrepresentation of the other party or his agent, the
contract is voidable and the deceived party may call it off, obtaining
restitution of any consideration already paid.'" This rule applies to
business purchase contracts as well as to any other contract.'" The
right to restitution for misrepresentation is closely parallel to the right
to the same remedy for "total breach" of contract,'" and similar
1" This would, of course, not apply if the promise were merely one to use best
efforts. Whether failure in such case, even if not actionable, might excuse further per-
formance by the other party would depend upon the express provisions, or in their
absence, the construction of the contract as a whole.
tai
	 may be terminated by cancellation of the basic agreement. Thus, in
Koch v. Han-Shire Divs. Inc., 273 Minn. 155, 140 N.W.2d 55 (1966), when the seller
of a business pursued its right under the terms of the agreement to rescind the trans-
action for non-payment of installments by the buying corporation, guarantees by the
buyer's principal stockholder were held terminated, and stock pledged to secure his per-
formance was ordered returned to him.
182 Restatement of Contracts §§ 136, 141 (1932).
les But see Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
104
	
pp. 869-71 infra. Derivative actions, brought by stockholders on behalf of the
corporation against its fiduciaries, are another possibility.
106 Restatement of Contracts § 476 (1932) ; 12 Williston on Contracts {I§ 1523, 1525
(3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Williston).
1" Hirshon v. Whelan, 113 A.2d 484, 485 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1955) ; Springer
v. Korotki, 215 Md. 310, 137 A.2d 655 (1958).
107 See pp. 852-53 supra; compare Restatement of Contracts § 347-57 with 111 470-
91 (1932).
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requirements of prompt assertion of rights are imposed. 188 Neither
willfulness, scienter, nor even negligence is a necessary element of a
cause of action for restitution; mere innocent misrepresentation of a
material fact is sufficient.'
It is quite common in contracts for the sale of a business to
classify as "warranties" only representations of present fact, and to
label commitments as to future events as "covenants" or "promises."
If this nomenclature is employed, "breaches of warranty" and "mis-
representations" become synonymous!" For purposes of this article,
however, "warranty" will be used in its normal sense—broad enough
to include, for example, a promise that an appliance will perform satis-
factorily for a year. In this sense, breaches of warranty may or may
not involve misrepresentation. Where the warranty consists of a state-
ment of present fact and the statement turns out to be incorrect, it
may be deemed to be a misrepresentation, whether or not intentional.
Warranties directed to future events, however—such as those per-
taining to the contents of a balance sheet or profit-and-loss statement
to be drawn up in the future—even if untrue would not normally be
regarded as misrepresentations unless the party making them implies
the existence of present facts which are not true. 171
Since restitution is available for breaches of warranty regardless
of the presence or absence of misrepresentation, in most instances
nothing is added to the plaintiff's case by proof of misrepresentation.
One important point, however, is that restitution for breach is per-
mitted only if the breach may be characterized as "total"; 1" on the
other hand, restitution for innocent misrepresentation will be granted
if the misrepresentation was "material,'" while any fraudulent mis-
representation will be sufficient!'"
168 See Restatement of Contracts §§ 480, 482-84 (1932); Sy-Jo Luncheonette, Inc.
v. Marsav Distribs., Inc., 279 App. Div. 715, 108 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1st Dept 1951), aff'd,
304 N.Y. 747, 108 N.E.2d 614 (1952).
169 Restatement of Contracts §§ 470, 476 (1932); see Lockwood v. Christakos, 181
F.2d 805, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
170 Quite frequently in business sale contracts, these provisions denominated as
"covenants" and "conditions" in the contract, become "warranties" at the closing, and
as such are specifically stated to survive the closing and to be actionable if breached
thereafter.
171 "A promissory statement or even a prediction may involve by necessary impli-
cation an assertion that other facts than a state of mind exist, from which the promised
or predicted consequences will follow, and there is, therefore, in such case a representation
as to those other facts." Restatement of Contracts § 473, Comment c (1932).
172 See pp. 852-53 supra. It will be recalled that a "total" breach may be something
less than complete failure on the part of the defendant to render any performance.
173 Restatement of Contracts § 476 (1932). A "material" misrepresentation, in this
context, would seem to be something less than a "material" breach, as described in Re-
statement of Contracts § 275 (1932), which is one of the tests of a "total" breach required
for restitution in Restatement of Contracts § 347 (1932).
174 Restatement of Contracts § 476, Comment b (1932). Another consequence of
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B. Damages
As an alternative to restitution, the aggrieved party in the case
of misrepresentation may keep the contract in force and sue for dam-
ages for misrepresentation. Whether the cause of action is characterized
as one in tort or contract is becoming increasingly unimportant under
modern "one form of action" procedural codes, but it may still make
a difference in some jurisdictions what theory is asserted.
Where the misrepresentation takes the form of a breach of war-
ranty, the plaintiff can ignore the tort, if any, and sue on a contract
theory, with his measure of damages reflecting the difference between
the value of what he received and what be was promised that he would
receive."' In case of a profitable contract, this measure of damages
is likely to be greater than the traditional tort measure of putting
him in a position financially equivalent to the position he had been in
before entering into the transaction."' Moreover, warranty liability,
like all contract liability, is in a sense a form of strict or absolute
liability, not dependent upon any showing of fault.
There are many other types of misrepresentation, however, that
do not involve warranties or breaches of contract, where it would be
difficult to spell out a theory for a contractual cause of action. In such
cases, it would be necessary instead to bring a tort action for deceit.'"
Moreover, even if a contract action is available, a plaintiff may de-
liberately or unwittingly couch his claim in terms of an action for
deceit.
The question of the measure of damages for deceit is not entirely
settled. There are competing analogies—on the one hand, the general
approach in tort law of putting the plaintiff in statu quo ante; on the
fraudulent, as distinguished from innocent, misrepresentations may be to avoid those
clauses in a contract to which they were addressed. Thus, in an action for restitution in
a contract for the purchase of a sandwich shop, in which the buyer alleged fraudulent
misrepresentations as to volume of business, but the contract included a disclaimer of
any representations, the court allowed restitution because of the fraud, but indicated that
if the misrepresentations had been innocent the disclaimer clause would have barred
relief. Lockwood v. Christakos, 181 F.2d 805 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
175 See pp. 839-42 supra.
178 On the other hand, the possibility of punitive damages, available in tort cases,
would be barred in a contract action.
177 Just as an action for damages is not subject to the same requirements of
promptness as in an action for restitution, a tort action for deceit may be brought after
the time for demanding restitution for misrepresentations has long since passed. See
Sy-Jo Luncheonette, Inc., v. Marsav Distribs., Inc., 279 App. Div. 715, 108 N.Y.S.2d 349
(1st Dep't 1951), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 747, 108 N.E.2d 614 (1952). And where restitution in a
business purchase contract may not be granted because of lack of jurisdiction over in-
dispensable parties, a tort action for deceit against parties before the court who have
- made representations to the plaintiff is permissible. See Ward v. Deavers, 203 F.2d 72,
75-76 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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other, the argument that the victim of a fraudulent breach should
surely not recover less than the victim of an innocent one.
For a long time, the tort approach was dominant, and if an action
was brought for deceit the successful plaintiff was restored to his
situation before the transaction."' Thus, in a contract for the sale of
a business for $1,000,000, where the value of the business was
$1,100,000, if the seller fraudulently warranted certain assets to be
worth $150,000 more than they actually were, the buyer could re-
cover $150,000 for breach of warranty; if he sued for deceit, however,
he would be awarded only $50,000.
In recent years, there has been a trend away from this limitation
on damages for deceit. While the Restatement of Torts followed the
statu quo ante rule,'" the Tentative Draft of the Restatement Sec-
ond"' adds a subsection stating: "The recipient of a fraudulent mis-
representation in a business transaction is also entitled to recover
damages sufficient to give him the benefit of his contract with the
maker, if such damages are proved with reasonable certainty."' And
the Council's notes point out that the benefit-of-the-bargain rule is
now followed in a large majority of the states."2 Finally, with respect
to the sale of goods, the Uniform Commercial Code has also reached
the same result; Section 2-721 provides: "Remedies for material mis-
representation or fraud include all remedies available under this
Article for nonfraudulent breach. . . ."'"
The other principal shortcoming of the tort remedy for misrepre-
sentation, as compared with the contractual remedy, has been the
requirement of fraud, or at least negligence, as a necessary element in
plaintiff's case." Here too, the standards are changing, although less
rapidly,'" and Prosser reports that a substantial minority of states
ITS The leading case was Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y. 546, 124 N.E. 144 (1919).
170 Restatement of Torts § 549 (1938).
180 Restatement (Second) of Torts (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
151 Id. § 549(2).
182 Id. Comment 2.
183 The official Comment states as the purpose of U.C.C. § 2-721, "[t]o correct the
situation by which remedies for fraud have been more circumscribed than the more
modern and mercantile remedies for breach of warranty. Thus, the remedies for fraud
are extended by this section to coincide in scope with those for non-fraudulent
breach. . . ."
184 Restatement of Torts II 525 (1938) requires fraud for a cause of action for
deceit. Id. § 552 allows a cause of action in certain circumstances for negligent misrepre-
sentation; although the emphasis of the text, comment and illustrations is on negligence
of a third person rather than of a party to the contract, the latter would seem to be
an a fortiori case.
188 The tentative drafts of the Restatement (Second) of Torts do not propose
changing the rule in this respect.
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now allow an action for deceit to be based upon innocent misrepre-
sentations.18°
C. Reformation
Where the fraud of one party and the mistake of the other, or
the mutual mistake of both, cause a written contract to fail to express
the intention of both, a court of equity will generally reform the
contract to reflect their actual agreement.'" But this remedy is not
available in the more common case of an agreement induced by fraud
or mistake which accurately reflected what the parties meant.'"
D. Constructive Trust
One who induces a transfer of property through fraud may be
obliged to hold it in constructive trust for the transferor, and will be
required to account to him for any profits made from it or for the
proceeds if he has disposed of it. 1"
E. Rule 10b-5
While there are several provisions in the federal securities laws
expressly or impliedly authorizing civil actions for various types of
wrongdoing, by far the most widely used basis for such statutory
causes of action is Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5. 1"
For 10b-5 to be applicable at all, the transaction has to involve
((securities." This includes a sale of the stock of a company but—
although "security" is construed fairly broadly in this area—probably
not a sale of assets for cash unless the assets were themselves peculiarly
of a type employed for investment or speculation.'" However, if the
assets were sold for stock in the buying company, Rule 10b-S would,
of course, be applicable.
180
 See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 724-29 (3d ed. 1964).
182 Restatement of Contracts §§ 491, 504 (1932).
188 See 12 Williston, supra note 165, § 1525A.
289 Restatement of Restitution § 166 (1936) ; see text at note 209 infra.
100 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of ' any security.
in See 12 Williston, supra note 165, § 1516A at 503 et seq.
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Another jurisdictional requirement, reflecting statutory and ul-
timately constitutional limitations, is that either interstate commerce,
the mails or a national securities exchange be employed. Where a trans-
action is peculiarly local and the mails are avoided, but intrastate
telephone calls are made, there is a split of authority as to whether
the use of the telephone within one state is to be deemed a use of a
portion of the interstate telephone network and, therefore, sufficient
to bring the Rule into play.'"
The law as to the remedies available for 10b-5 violations is still
in a formative stage, and most of the decisions thus far are on the
pleadings rather than on the merits. Certain principles seem to be
evolving, however. Less seems to be required for a lOb-5 cause of
action than for common law deceit, at least in most jurisdictions;
willfulness or intent to deceive are not required, and non-disclosure of
material information, where "the plaintiff would have been influenced
to act differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him
the undisclosed fact,'u93 is in itself sufficient for a cause of action.'"
Either a buyer or a seller may sue for a violation of Rule 10b-5,'"
and sales of one hundred percent of the stock of closely held corpora-
tions are not excluded.'" Moreover, misstatements in connection with
mergers have been held by the Supreme Court to fall within Rule 10b-5,
the term "purchase or sale" as used in both the statute"' and the
Rule198 being construed sufficiently broadly to apply.'" In addition,
the fact that the misstatements were contained in a proxy statement
(which is likely to be true in many instances of complaints arising out
of mergers), and that false statements in proxy solicitations are spe-
cifically covered by a different section of the sta.tutem and a different
SEC Rule,201 were held not to exclude Rule 10b-5 coverage.'
192 Compare Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 727-28 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968), with Burke v. Triple A Machine Shop, Inc., Current Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. g 92,949 (C.A. 9, Feb. 9, 1971).
193 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965). The court rejected the contention that it was not necessary to show
any degree of reliance upon the misrepresentation.
194 A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud: SEC Rule 10b-5 13 8.2, 8.4 and cases
cited therein (1967) [hereinafter cited as Bromberg]; cf. Restatement of Torts § 525,
529 (1938).
195 Bromberg, supra note 194, at 	 8.8.
196 Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870
(1961) ; Dauphin Corp. v. Davis, 201 F. Supp. 470 (D. Del. 1962).
197 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 785(b) (1964).
198 See note 190 supra.
199 SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
zoo. Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
	 78n (1964).
201 SEC Rule 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9(a) (1970) ; see J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
292 SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468-69 (1969); see also Brom-
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The types of remedy thus far allowed under Rule 10b-5 follow
rather closely those available for common law causes of action. Ag-
grieved buyers may demand return of the purchase price, 203 and the
sellers' stock must be returned. This is, of course, the equivalent of
common law restitution.204 Alternatively, the buyer may keep the stock
and sue for damages, but there is some doubt as to whether the measure
of damages is the expected profit rather than merely the out-of-pocket
An aggrieved seller may secure the difference between the price
paid him and true value,' which is analogous to common law dam-
ages,207 or may presumably obtain restitution if the stock is still in
the hands of the buyer. 208 If it has been sold, he can pursue a construc-
tive trust theory and recover the buyer's profits. 209
Relief under Rule 1Ob-5 is not limited to actions for damages
or rescission; criminal sanctions, administrative proceedings and in-
junctions have also been pursued. There have been indications that
injunctive relief may be more readily obtained than damages."
Rule 10b-5 remedies are not limited to actions between buyers
and sellers, but may in appropriate cases be asserted against other
persons committing misrepresentations or otherwise violating the Rule,
such as broker-dealers 211 and accountants."
As in the case of contract actions, but unlike the tort analogy,
punitive damages are apparently not allowed in 10b-5 actions."
berg, supra note 194, at § 6.5. Non-statutory remedies may also be available where
grievances arise out of a merger. In Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 268-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), it was held that the shareholder of a corporation merged into another
could still bring a derivative action, with the recovery going to the stockholders of the
merged-in corporation.
203 Bromberg, supra note 194, at § 9.1 and cases cited therein.
204 See pp. 854-55 supra.
205 Bromberg, supra note 194, at § 9.1; compare Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962), with
pp. 867-68 supra.
200 Bromberg, supra note 194, at § 9.1.
207 See pp. 839-43 supra.
208 See W. Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations 790-91 (4th ed. 1969) ; Ruder,
Texas Gulf Sulphur—The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Pur-
chase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Rev. 423, 427 (1968).
2" Bromberg, supra note 194, at § 9.1; cf. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,
248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969); 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1421 (1970).
210 See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967);
Friendly, J., concurring, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-68 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
211 See Bromberg, supra note 194, ch. 5.
212 See Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 104-05 (N.D. Ill. 1967);
Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Bromberg, supra note 194,
at § 7.4(2).
213 Green V. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969); Bromberg, supra note 194, at § 9.1 n.20; 12 Williston, supra note 165, at
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CONCLUSION
There is remarkably little law specifically addressed to questions
of remedies for grievances arising out of agreements to buy and sell
businesses. Principles of general application, however, will be found
to be relevant in most situations and diapositive in many. Finally, the
Uniform Commercial Code—whether actually controlling or applied by
way of analogy—must be regarded as a major source of law in this area.
§ 1516c at 533 et seq.; cf. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
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